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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Why are some of Spain's peoples denied Spanishness? What does this 
denial tell us about Spanishness itself? (Freeman 1979:244) 
Uncomfortable truths travel with difficulty. (Levi 1988:159) 
This essay is a component of a larger project designed to examine the 
construction of cultural memory, specifically the interpretation and 
transmission of historical knowledge in Spain and Catalonia. It is an 
outgrowth of earlier work on political process and political economy in 
Catalonia (Pi-Sunyer 1971; 1974; 1976; 1980; 1985a; 1985b; 1987) and also builds 
on a longstanding interest in how Spanish historiography approaches the 
societal past (Glick and Pi-Sunyer 1969; Pi-Sunyer 1970). 
My point of departure is that in modern complex societies the genre 
commonly categorized as history represents a particular form of cultural 
construct devoted to the transmission, preservation, and alteration of the 
collective memory. History, in this sense, is crucial to social identity in that it 
functions as a fund of shared knowledge and as a system of cultural meanings 
(Geertz 1973:255; 312-313). In common with certain other bodies of shared 
knowledge, such as myth and religion, it helps to legitimate the social order 
and contextualize experience. 
The subject of history may be the past, but it is a past that is given 
pertinence in terms of the present, the point from which we arrange and 
reassess the relevance of past events (Lass 1988). I would agree with 
Errington's (1979:239) observation that the historical style is essentially moral, 
designed less to note down events than to explain them: "the genre history is 
an argument." It follows that meanings and significances are not fixed or 
given, but are to be understood processually, generated as they are 
developed and expressed. Hobsbawm (1983:13), making a direct linkage 
between history, politics, and general perceptions, writes that historians are 
engaged in "the creation, dismantling and restructuring of images of the past 
which belong not only to the world of specialist investigation but to the public 
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sphere of man as a political being." By extension, the same can be said to hold 
true of teachers and the writers of textbooks. Indeed, all structured learning, 
and most directly that which attempts to engender a sense of the social order, 
forms part of this political-ideological sphere. While the validity of this general 
proposition is something for specialists to ponder, the issue of how collective 
pasts should be remembered and commemorated (including Czeslaw Milosz's 
assessment that "a refusal to remember" is symptomatic of our age) is 
obviously a matter of much more general concern.l 
If we grant that history, in this sense, has the potential of instilling or 
reinforcing shared values, we must ask whose ethos, whose history? There are 
many possible answers, and much depends on the specific circumstances. 
Clearly, though, history as cultural myth can work as a powerful force in 
forging strong links between different classes, links that may, under some 
circumstances, succeed in transcending deep cleavages and divisions. What I 
am suggesting is that the ideological functions of history can fruitfully be 
examined from a perspective informed by Gramsci's (Femia 1987; Forgacs 
1988) model of cultural hegemony. He argues from the Italian case (one of 
particular relevance for Spain) that even societies with severe inequalities can 
remain surprisingly stable so long as the masses share with the elites a body of 
beliefs and traditions. Gramsci's analysis has been supplemented by more 
recent historical and cross-cultural studies of power, including the influential 
contributions of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984).2 
I will also be drawing on the history-as-discourse perspective developed 
by Michel Foucault and his followers. The Foucaultian analysis of discourse 
focuses on the configuration of systems of knowledge, and in particular of 
knowledge that ideologically legitimates the status quo. A discourse, in this 
sense, is a particular privileged representation of social reality; knowledge, in 
short, is power (Foucault 1980). Dominant discourses, however, do not stand 
unchallenged but are "endlessly accessible to new discourses and open to the 
task of transforming them" (Foucault 1975: xix). This sense that systems of 
thought are seldom monologic, but are potentially open to various 
interpretations and contestations, has already had a notable influence on the 
ethnographic interpretation of societies on the European periphery (Herzfeld 
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1987; McDonagh 1991). What I am suggesting is that a concern for discourse 
and dialogic narration points us in much the same direction as does the study 
of hegemony: the social organization of ruling relations, the sense that power 
and authority are never self-secured, but must be won and maintained. 
Ethnography, for its part, can contribute an insistence on context and on the 
importance of active subjects, elements that are seldom foregrounded in 
textually-based discourse analysis (Kinsman 1991). 
In this essay, I apply the Gramscian analysis of beliefs and institutions 
not so much to the direct issue of class relations, but to the processes that 
create and disseminate attitudes, beliefs, and practices respecting the nature 
and place of what I am calling marginal groups and populations. In part, this 
selection is conditioned by factors of space, but there is also the intrinsic 
interest of applying the paradigm to a different -- though obviously related --
order of group and power relations. 
Also, I will not be limiting myself to how history, as a bounded field, is 
conceptualized. While Spanish curricular organization remains strongly 
oriented to history (the other powerful card in comparative studies being 
geography), since the early 1970s it has-- in theory at least-- been taught in the 
wider context of a social world or social science program. Consequently, to 
examine only what emerges from the way the past is examined would distort 
what actually takes place in the classroom. But more than this, with respect to 
the issues being considered in this study, the approach and treatment 
accorded to "others" seems much the same whether they are in the past or in 
the present. 
The validity and utility of the general approach does not require that a 
system of education be fully consistent or free from conflict and contradiction. 
In fact, one of the virtues of the Gramscian paradigm is that it takes 
cognizance of both internal differentiation and over-reaching value systems. 
As numerous observers have noted (Mintz 1986:121; Moore 1978:49), an 
element of indeterminacy, of dissonance and arbitrariness, is very much a 
· characteristic of modern, complex, sociocultural orders, and this is no less 
true of Catalonia or of Spain as a whole (Pi-Sunyer 1987:168; 1988). It would be 
remarkable not to encounter alternative, even contradictory, societal 
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renderings or interpretations in the schoolroom, especially when we keep in 
mind the scope of political change that Spain has experienced since the 
dismantling of the Franco regime in the mid 1970s. What is surprising, and 
calls for explanation, is why certain issues and questions, such as those 
revolving around the many meanings of nation and people, receive much 
greater attention outside the classroom than within it. As. we shall see, this 
heavily contested domain is seldom ventured into by teachers and students. In 
contrast, there is little reluctance to tackle class as a political or economic 
category, particularly when the discussion is pitched at the level of abstract 
theory. Race and race relations, on the otherhand, are matters that receive 
little critical consideration, and do not appear to constitute-- as do ethnicity 
and nationalism -- issues that, while evidently important, are best left outside 
the school. 
What we have, therefore, is a degree of patterning that defines certain 
societal subjects and problems as proper for educational purposes, while 
others receive little consideration, either due to a reluctance to discuss the 
uncomfortable, or because the phenomenon itself is assumed to have little 
consequence. In part, this process of categorization reflects professional 
training; concretely, the fact that the social sciences play a limited role in the 
education of teachers while history is accorded the status of a privileged order 
of knowledge. If nothing else, this structuring is likely to limit awareness of 
certain ranges of social and cultural phenomena that do not normally form 
part of the historical canon. More important, in my judgment, is the issue of 
social priorities-- what is to be taught and why-- as these are understood and 
interpreted by different actors, including teachers, the educational 
establishment, parents and children. 
It is to this phenomenon of distribution that the title refers; the "absent 
others" is a congeries of groups that share a quality of marginality or 
peripherality. They have little in common besides alterity: they are "others" 
chiefly, I believe, because they are not viewed as really forming part o(the 
conceptual society. Alternatively, in some circumstances, the distinctiveness 
or identitygfsuch groups is played down. Needless to say, the reluctance of 
teachers to enter the state-and-nation debate is influenced by other factors, the 
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critical one being a desire to maintain a tranquil classroom environment. But, 
as we shall see, this politically charged issue does share some common 
ground -- an element of disquiet and anxiety -- with the academic treatment of 
marginal social groups. 
Undoubtedly, the archetypical example of social marginality is provided 
by the Gypsies. Gypsies have been a component of the Iberian mosaic since the 
early decades of the fifteenth century, and they continue to constitute a very 
visible presence in contemporary Spain. Nevertheless, only one (Centeno et al. 
1977:200-201) of the half dozen history and social science texts that I consulted 
made any reference to them, historically or in terms of present-day social 
issues. In the instance in question, Gypsies are discussed together with a 
variety of other marginal social groups -- including vagabonds and beggars --
that faced general persecution and state coercion in eighteenth century Spain. 
Calvo Buezas (1989), who has undertaken a careful analysis of social, ethnic 
and racial content in Spanish school texts, found a total of 17 references to 
Gypsies in his comprehensive sample (179 texts in social science, history, 
language and ethics/religion). In his opinion, one can reasonably assert that 
"Gypsies do not exist in Spanish school texts ... A few marginal references in 
so many thousands of pages and illustrations is the same as if they did not 
exist" (Calvo Buezas 1989:63). This is hardly an unreasonable assessment, 
since the 17 references make up a grand total of 59 lines in 41,803 pages of 
text.3 In my own case, the only substantive in-class treatment of contemporary 
Gypsies (in the wake of several episodes of violent anti-Gypsy activity reported 
in the press) was initiated by me during a general class discussion of racism, 
prejudice, and related matters. 
Other groups/social categories that commonly receive inadequate, 
sanitized, or ambivalent attention include Jews in late medieval and early 
modern Spain, Moors and contemporary Arabs, various relatively recent 
refugees and immigrants, and marginal socioeconomic elements, such as 
shantytown dwellers. Some of these people, for example recent arrivals from 
· Asia, have perhaps not been around long enough to enter public consciousness 
or the formal curriculum, but this can hardly be true of North Africans. 
We are not, it should be stressed, discussing a society of censorship nor 
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faculties and teachers subject to intimidation or powerful external controls. On 
the contrary, classroom teachers (not to mention university professors) enjoy a 
broad autonomy with respect to means and methods of instruction. We should 
also be mindful of a liberal and politically activist tradition in the teaching 
profession and the universities. The challenge, therefore, is to explicate the 
particular social orientation and content of a consciously progressive 
educational system. 
At the risk of disaggregating interrelated elements of the social 
process, I will develop my analysis by first addressing (as Spaniards probably 
would) the political dimension, moving next to a consideration of the 
educational system in general terms, and then focusing on the specific 
settings and situations in which I observed how teachers and students worked 
on, discussed, and gave meaning to subjects and issues. Finally, I will return 
to what are broadly political questions, in particular the relationship between 
the social world elaborated in the classroom and the rather different universe 
outside it. The matter is not simply one of goodness of fit, but ofhow the 
environment of learning elaborates a particular system of categories and a 
hierarchy of priorities. For what world, in short, is the next generation of 
citizens being prepared? It is my distinct impression that many of the issues 
and agendas that are bound to challenge Western Europe at the close of the 
century have barely surfaced in the curriculum. 
CHAPTER II 
THE TRANSITION 
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The transformation of the Spanish state in the course of the past dozen 
years from a dictatorship to a constitutional monarchy has received 
considerable, and merited, attention from scholars and political 
commentators. 4 Most of this attention has centered on the process of 
democratization, specifically the reestablishment after almost forty years of 
dictatorial rule of an effective system of representative parliamentary 
government. 
The very success of this transformation (especially when compared to 
the problems of post-communism in Eastern Europe) may have obscured for 
outside observers the difficulties that had to be overcome or negotiated, and the 
fact that democratization was part of a more general reordering of the political 
system. The most important internal parallel development involved the change 
from a unitary state with a long tradition of centralized control to what 
Spaniards term a "state of the autonomies," fundamentally a system of 
regional power sharing. With respect to external relations, it was the goal of 
post-Franco administrations to forge strong political, economic, and cultural 
ties with other European democracies. These matters -- the problems that the 
process encountered, the internal reorganization of the state, and the links to 
Europe -- all have relevance to the conduct of education. 
Spain is now divided into 17 Autonomous Communities [Fig. 1]. Three 
of these -- the Basque Country or Euzkadi, Catalonia, and Galicia -- are 
recognized as "historic" in the sense that they had already achieved or voted 
for statutes of autonomy during the Second Republic (1931-1939). The other 
communities are a post-Franco development, although some of these areas are 
characterized by a certain tradition of particularism or had for some time 
manifested a desire for greater administrative decentralization. 
Much remains to be worked out in the relationship between 
autonomous communities and the state, and this includes important 
educational concerns such as levels of central government funding. Some 
critical matters, however, have achieved a relatively satisfactory resolution, 
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specifically the language question and the issue of primary responsibility over 
education. Since 1980, education in Catalonia has been under the authority of a 
Catalan Department of Education, the Departament d'Ensenyament of the 
Generalitat (Autonomous Government) of Catalonia. Much instruction (from 
preschool to university) is conducted in Catalan, and while this reorganization 
of education does not assure that Catalan will be applied in all contexts or 
ranges outside the school, it has contributed to making Catalan "a language 
used for all communication purposes, at all levels of social and political 
organization" (Woolard 1991:51). The institutional support of Catalan, in the 
school and elsewhere, has done a good deal to alleviate the fears of many 
Catalans that their language and their culture are at risk. For our purposes, 
what this amounts to is that the discourse on education and culture in 
Catalonia has increasingly shifted to the domain of regular politics -- a very 
different setting from that of a generation ago when advocates of Catalan 
cultural and linguistic rights were in very real danger ofimprisonment.5 
To this point, I have been discussing the transition in very general 
terms, but the forces that shaped it and the direction it took, have to be 
contextualized. What were the majority of Spaniards trying to free 
themselves from? What constraints did they face? 
The Franco regime was a conservative and repressive political order, 
lacking a coherent ideology, and quite incapable of "evolving" into anything 
that might pass muster as a democratic system. In retrospect, what ordinary 
people most often remember is the sheer grayness of everyday life, the 
anachronistic texture of the regime (forms, symbols, and institutions), and 
how isolated they felt themselves to be from the rest of Western Europe. 
Economic and class disparities were profound. In this respect, we might note 
that of every 100 students who began primary school in the early 1950s, 27 
progressed to secondary education, ten passed the bachillerato marking the 
completion of secondary education, and only three graduated from the 
university (Walsh 1972:241-242). As recently as 1960, 26 percent ofmen, and 30 
percent of women, 25 years of age and over, had completed less than four years 
of elementary education; the category encompasses illiterates and those 
without any formal education (United Nations 1968:351). The moral order of 
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the regime was characterized by enormous contradictions: an official religious 
orthodoxy in tandem with the most extreme and entrenched privileges for 
regime supporters; a cult of technocracy and developmentism coexisting with 
a public morality that came close to making Spain a caricature of itself. And 
all this ensconced in a political system that, while evidently irrational and 
arbitrary, was still powerful enough to keep democracy at bay. 
To the degree that one can speak of a Francoist ideology, it was a 
strange emalgam of fascist mimesis and Catholic corporatism. More than 
anything else, though, it has to be understood as a system of rejection: a 
rejection of the Spanish intellectual renaissance which in the early decades of 
this century gave Spanish artists and thinkers an international reputation; a 
rejection of"alien" concepts and ideologies (everything from Marxism to 
psychoanalysis); and, of course, a rejection of political and cultural pluralism. 
Spain, regime ideologues insisted, should be guided by "historic" virtues and 
precepts such as fervent Catholicism, the military spirit, and the "natural 
order" of hierarchy. Carr (1988:28) is no doubt right to stress that the most 
important achievement of the opposition is "that it challenged the regime's 
claim to legitimacy" and exposed its "intellectual poverty." 
But granted that long before the death of Franco (November 20, 1975) the 
ideological foundations of the system had ceased to have relevance, it was still 
far from clear what direction Spain would take. The ideology might be defunct, 
but this still left in place a system of government and powerful political 
interests. The problem was cogently rendered by a group of political analysts 
("Democracia 2000" 1977:184) reviewing the first year of post-Franco 
administration: "Franco left no heirs, but he did leave collaborators. 
Francoism no longer exists, but neo-Francoism does." 
The administration that came into power following the dictator's 
demise made so little progress towards democracy that the political and social 
climate turned increasingly tense and and confrontational. Nor was this 
failure to initiate significant reform remarkable given that the government 
was headed by Carlos Arias Navarro, a former Minister of the Interior who 
had been Franco's last Prime Minister. The growing tempo of strikes and 
demonstrations was met by police actions (five workers were killed by the 
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police in March of 1976) that served to fuel discontent. At this juncture, the 
critical question was whether Spain could indeed find a way to establish a 
democratic order through some process of reform, or whether mounting 
pressures would require something much more drastic, a violent break -- a 
ruptura -- with the system inherited from the regime. 
The details of how, mainly through negotiation and compromise, 
reform became the selected avenue of change falls outside the purview of this 
monograph, but the general process and its consequences are obviously 
pertinent to our enquiry.6 Fundamentally, it was an arranged, initially even 
an improvised, transition brokered by the major personages of the political 
opposition and the more reform-minded members of the Francoist system. The 
process required a substantial amount of political space (something greatly 
facilitated by the resignation of Arias in July of 1976), and also the willingness 
of the parties to search for a democratic formula that would nevertheless 
permit the retention of much of the institutional and administrative armature 
of the state. 
The informal, and later formal, negotiations that took place between the 
death of Franco and the approval of the Constitution in 1978 established a 
framework that stressed consensus and pragmatism over ideology. This 
general position was explained by Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez in a speech 
before the Cortes (parliament) in April of 1978. "During a constituent process," 
he said, 
the government must restrict its options to those which 
would not produce dissensus, because that is the only way 
to avoid what would be the gravest danger to the body politic: 
the lack of a concord rooted in the country and [the lack of] 
respect for the basic elements of national coexistence (quoted 
in Gunther et al. 1988:119). 
One has the distinct impression that the negotiators were very conscious of the 
fragility of the political situation, and it is certainly true that both th~ 
government and the opposition selected moderate and pragmatic 
representatives. In due course, amnesty was granted to political prisoners and 
a spectrum of political parties were legalized. The Movimiento (the official 
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"National Movement" inspired by fascism) and its syndicates were dismantled 
and free trade unions emerged from clandestinity. Finally, the electoral 
system was put in place and the outlines of the autonomy statutes negotiated. 
For its part, the opposition, and in particular the established parties of 
the left, made a number of important concessions. Chief among these was 
recognition of the keystone constitutional role of the monarchy (Prince Juan 
Carlos, it must be remembered, had been designated successor head of state by 
Franco in 1969) and the privileged place of the military in state affairs. The 
transition also involved a clear understanding that political figures, 
regardless of prior affiliation, who wished to continue their careers would not 
be hampered from doing so. Indeed, Adolfo Suarez, the first Prime Minister to 
be democratically elected since 1936, may quite accurately be described as a 
former Movimiento functionary: he had served as Director-General of Radio 
and Television (the electronic media was a fief of this organization) between 
1969 and 1974, and later, in its terminal phase, held the top position of Minister 
and Secretary-General of the Movimiento. We should note that the agreed upon 
avenue for change involved two stages: the long course of negotiations to 
establish a political framework, followed by referenda and elections to confer 
on this framework full democratic legitimacy. This whole process permitted a 
formal legal transmission of authority; as Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez 
(1985:5-6) expressed it some years ago, 
This transition-- and this is the most significant feature 
in the case of Spain -- was carried out without any sudden 
violation of established legality, and without a single day's 
institutional gap. 
The redemocratization of Spain thus represents something quite 
distinct in the way of political reordering. While the change has been real 
enough, it is, above all, a process designed to integrate, rather than to 
peripheralize, individuals and selected structures of the antecedent regime. 
Expressed differently, the last of the historic fascist regimes has been 
·displaced in the absence of internal revolution or external overthrow, and with 
something approaching a political consensus (at least on the part of party 
elites) regarding the desirability of avoiding too critical a scrutiny of the 
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process itself, the Civil War, and the dictatorship imposed on Spain by the 
victory of General Franco. 
This is an understandable approach in the light of the country's 
conflictive past and more recent fears regarding potentially explosive 
cleavages in Spanish society. Clearly, though, the pattern is unusual, and 
evidently, it is not an arrangement likely to foster deep concerns respecting the 
societal past, a sense that the actions taken one or two generations ago 
continue to have significant contemporary meaning. The journalist Gregorio 
Moran's (1992) recent book on the transition goes considerably further in 
arguing that a loss of collective memory is the "price" that Spaniards have 
paid for their particular route to democracy. It is important to note here that in 
Spain today neither the past nor specific elements of it are explicitly defined as 
out of bounds. However, there is some evidence that the political compact 
works, to some degree and in subtle ways, to help order the universe of 
enquiry. 
There are other contextual factors that make recent Spanish experience 
significantly different from that of its neighbors. Spain, we should remember, 
did not directly participate in a series of key events and processes that marked 
the majority of Western societies. Most obviously, it avoided the trauma of 
World War II. Thus, unlike the French across the Pyrenees, Spaniards have 
never had to grapple-- however cautiously-- with such knotty issues as who 
sided with the Nazi occupiers, and why. Also, since Spain had lost virtually all 
of its imperial possessions in the Spanish-American War of 1898, 
decolonization seemed to pose few of the problems -- and hence raised few of 
the questions -- that it did for many other countries. 
Post-World War II Spanish experience has also been distinct in several 
other respects: the regime was ostracized by the victorious Allies, borders were 
closed, ambassadors withdrawn. And, of course, there was no Marshall Plan 
for Spain. All this began to change as a result of the Cold War and the 1953 
bases agreement with the United States, but American aid and a changed 
political climate did not, and could not, confer legitimacy on the regime. Spain 
remained a political anomaly, and many Spaniards continued to feel 
themselves disconnected from the European mainstream. If anything, the 
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rapid expansion of foreign tourism, and the irowirig number of Spaniards 
working in richer countries; only aggravated the sense of difference and 
isolation (Pi-Sunyer 1973, 1979). 
These almost forty years of isolation an:d petipheralization go a long 
way in explaining why all who were engaged in resistance to the regime (and 
even many who had been associated with it), insisted that Spainhad·to reclaim 
its place as a European society. This need had, and continues to have, many 
dimensions, but above all, "Europe" meant the legitimacy, the status, that had 
always evaded Franco. In the words of Jose Antonio Martinez Soler, chief 
economics editor of El Pais, "The Common Market always slammed the door 
in Franco's face every time he called. To join the Nine was to have regimes 
similar to theirs. Political problems were the main obstacle to our 
membership" (New York Times, May 21, 1980)~ 
Spain became a full member of the European Community (EC) in 1986 
and the political and economic significance of this membership is readily 
apparent. For Spaniards the linkage also carries powerful connotations in 
terms of values, beliefs, and aspirations. At the risk of oversimplification, 
one can say that Western European countries are conceived of as modernized 
secular societies with intellectual and social environments rooted in 
established traditions of tolerance and reason. 7 Even today, with Spain an 
active and established EC member, it is hard to find a country that displays its 
Europeanness so conspicuously. "To be European," says Finance Minister 
Carlos Solchaga, "is the same as to solve the internal problems of this country" 
(The Economist, April 25, 1992). Perhaps this is ministerial overstatement, but 
it is certainly true that the flag of the Community flies everywhere, from posh 
hotels to village squares. 
In conclusion, the transition has been-- and still continues to be-- a 
complex process involving not only the reestablishment of democratic 
institutions but, less explicitly, the search for new definitions of self and 
society. The process labors under some constraints. The political system is 
new, yet it can hardly represent a total rejection of everything associated with 
the recent past. Democracy and pluralism have been gained, but at a 
considerable price (which is not to deny that other avenues might have been 
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much costlier). The stress on European identity and European links is 
perfectly understandable, but a "European" conceptual model may prove to be 
of only limited utility for purposes of social policy as Spain confronts the reality 
of a changing human and cultural environment -- one that includes a growing 
non-white population. This is an issue that I will discuss in the final chapter, 
but fundamentally, at the same time that Spain is increasingly converging 
with its Western European neighbors (not the least in economic terms), its 
citizens have barely begun to recognize that the Europe of the next century is 
bound to be a multiracial universe. Spain, in common with France and Italy, 
not only faces Africa across the Mediterranean, but is proximate to regions of 
extreme poverty and demographic pressure. How this conjuncture is 
addressed will mark not only the countries to the south, but also the nature 
and identity of Iberian societies. A different transition, to be sure, but an 
equally important one. 
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CHAPTER III 
MODELS OF EDUCATION AND MODELS OF SOCIETY 
In this section I will be looking at three related matters: what it means 
(and has meant) to be "educated"; the role of the state in education; and the 
problems that educational reform has encountered. I make the assumption 
that the successful implementation of national educational policies depends on 
a reasonable degree of political agreement respecting models and on an 
adequate level of funding. As we shall see, education in Spain has been beset by 
major difficulties, both economic and social-political. 
One of the major reasons I undertook this research was that the time 
seemed particularly opportune. I knew from earlier work that issues of 
education were taken very seriously and that, historically, one of the major 
lines of social and political cleavage passed through education. I was also 
aware that both the Generalitat in Catalonia and the central government in 
Madrid had defined education as a top priority. At the same time, it was 
obvious that education, including its perceived mission, was in some crisis, in 
part as a consequence of growing youth unemployment. 
What I was not prepared for (and it appears that in this I was not 
alone) were the massive, and often violent, student demonstrations and strikes 
that I found on my arrival in early February 1987, and which continued for 
weeks. Students fought running battles with riot police on the steps of the 
Spanish Parliament, confronted them in front of the Prime Minister's 
residence, and took to the streets in all the large cities, including Barcelona. 
As more than one observer noted, it all brought back memories of anti-regime 
activity during the last years of Franco, but obviously the context was different, 
and it is this difference that makes the phenomenon pertinent to this essay. 
In earlier times, the students in the streets had in the main come from 
the universities, but these "mobilizations" were the work of adolescents, mostly 
high school students, but also some out-of-work youths. Initially, I found the 
·level ofviolence and the degree of anger incomprehensible. The major 
grievances -- high school fees and university entrance requirements -- simply 
did not appear to warrant recourse to Molotov cocktails-- or the risks of a bad 
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beating at the hands of the police. Also, the target seemed inappropriate. The 
government, in fact, had been spending more on education and the Minister of 
Education had recently described its policy as based on "equality of 
opportunity" and the "goal of an egalitarian school system together with an 
occupational system where social mobility is not restricted by the rigidities of 
privilege" (Maravall1987:72). 
Evidently, the young demonstrators saw matters in a very different 
light and it is worth considering their major complaint, the tightening of 
selectividad,8 the university entrance requirements. What needs to be kept in 
mind is that, until a few years ago, educational triage had occurred almost 
exclusively at the level of secondary education: families that could afford to 
send their children to private secondary school also could maintain them 
through university since tuition was low and virtually all students lived at 
home. Secondary education, in short, was the key to careers and professions, 
and thus to economic security. Also, much more than is the case in some other 
countries, secondary school is supposed to provide the background and 
training that defines the educated person, while universities are basically in 
the business of turning out professionals. 
The students in the streets (and later in the classrooms) were thus 
expressing not simply frustration, but a fear that the rules had been changed 
on them. As one editorial writer expressed it, "They are not demanding liberty 
(as during Francoism), which exists, but security, action and money, that is to 
say, guarantees for a very uncertain future" (Morado 1987:13). Other 
commentators took note that this was essentially a middle class revolt sparked 
by fears that a cap was being placed on social mobility (Sotelo 1987:13; Umbral 
1987:52). 
All of these observation are apropos, but they do not directly address 
why the sense of entitlement should be so strong. Part of the reason would 
appear to be linked to the control which the state now, as in the past, exercises 
over different types of professional accreditation. This is particularly 
significant given the employment situation and the fact that the state,- in its 
different guises, continues to be a major employer of skilled personnel. 
Less easy to document as a determinant of these actions, since the 
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matter is structural and qualitative, is what may be termed fear of status loss. 
It is a common foreign misconception that Spain is, or until recently was, a 
rigidly stratified society. On the contrary, while it is certainly a class society, 
for the better part of two centuries the system has provided significant (and 
symbolically important) opportunities for individual mobility.9 The most 
important channel of access into the elite has been education, specifically the 
acquisition of that particular form ofknowledge that Spaniards know as 
cultura, and which (with care) may be glossed as "culture." 
Cultura can be understood as both the world-view of a learned elite and 
as an ideology of mobility through education. According to Amelang (1986:125), 
who has studied its influence in early modern Catalonia, "This ideology did 
much to dignify the status of upwardly mobile urban elites determined to 
redefine the boundaries of the ruling class." He proceeds to examine its major 
attributes: "First, contemporaries took pains to define "culture" as acquired 
knowledge ... it was thus a markedly public form of knowledge ... As a result, 
"culture" often-- though hardly exclusively-- found validation through 
institutional sanctions like university degrees. It also possessed close ties to 
literacy ... Finally, elite cultura was highly restrictive in character-- that is, 
the limits placed on access by outsiders defined it to a crucial extent" 
(Amelang 1986:180). 
With respect to content and style, cultura reflected classical notions 
ofbreeding and an emphasis on abstract, speculative thought. The essential 
dichotomy was between this type of knowledge-- displayed in the language of 
erudition-- and empirical knowledge associated with manual labor and the 
lower classes. Cultura, in common with its cognates in other European 
languages, also carries powerful associations ofterritoriality, rootedness and 
sedentarism, "a sedentarism that is taken for granted to such an extent that it 
is nearly invisible" (Malkki 1992:31). This is a connection of some importance 
(and one that we shall return to) since so many of the groups that have 
suffered exclusion are commonly perceived as nomadic, displaced or 
otherwise lacking a firm territorial base. Needless to say, the division between 
rootedness and displacement carries deep metaphysical and moral 
implications. 
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How relevant is this analysis for contemporary Spain? Obviously, a 
great deal has changed. For one thing, the sheer quantitative factors are most 
important: at no time in Spanish history have so many students attended 
secondary school or has such a high proportion of the appropriate age cohort 
been enrolled in universities. Also, much of the content of knowledge has 
undergone a transformation. As a case in point, there is now a tremendous 
demand for degrees in business, information science, and technology -- keys to 
careers in the modern sector. Furthermore, the particular world-view 
represented by traditional notions of cultura does not easily fit a society which 
defines itself as modern, pluralistic, and democratic. Lastly, intellectuals, 
including teachers and professors, have been at the forefront of reform 
movements. 
Having said this, elements of the old system of values endure. Among 
these is the belief that the hierarchy of labor tends to reflect the hierarchy of 
intelligence, even if the measure of intelligence is today much less closely 
linked to traditional learning. It is interesting in this respect that not a few 
students accused the police of being both brutal and "lacking culture," one of 
their chants suggesting that the children of the police should attend the 
university in order to avoid becoming like their fathers.lO One of my young 
informants described the behavior of the police as "very third world-like," 
meaning both brutal and uncultured. 
Adolescents do not develop such ideas in isolation. The formal 
curriculum with its propensity to order events logically and sequentially, 
reinforces a sense of cultural continuity with the past, and -- not surprisingly 
-- the past that matters is the remembered past of Iberian society. This past not 
only supplies reaffirmation, but much of it is rendered as a time of national 
power and influence.ll Obviously, greatness so understood is likely to be 
represented as the work of elite personages -- cultured and educated 
individuals. The distinction between "cultured" and "uncultured" even enters 
some of the best pedagogical material. A superior social science syllabus, 
Living in a Diverse and Unequal World, offers an anthropologically-inspired 
definition of culture and establishes as major goals of the course that students 
should arrive at an understanding of "the relativity of their own culture" and 
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appreciate the need to 11have respect for, and interest in, other cultures and 
styles oflife11 (Freixenet et al. 1986:5-6). But, a shift in meaning occurs a couple 
of pages later when, in discussing issues of inequality, one of the designated 
causes is stated to be 11inequality in culturallevels11 (Freixenet et al. 1986:9). At 
the very least, this juxtaposition is likely to cause semantic confusion, but 
more to the point, what we seem to have here is an echo of cultura as 
previously discussed. 
The purpose here is not to criticize, on the basis of one phrase, what is 
in most respects an excellent experimental study plan, but simply to show that 
even in such a setting cultura continues to retain elements of its old meaning. 
I concur with Amelang (1986:215) that 11the overall schema of cultural 
distinction has persisted to the present day, .. a position similar to that 
expressed by McDonogh (1986:10), another observer of class and society in 
Catalonia, who notes 11the striking permanence in the ideas to which 
succeeding generations accede ... Cultura, albeit substantially changed in 
content, continues to function as an explanation for the existence of social 
inequalities, and as such, is bound to influence the way that people, including 
schoolchildren, conceptualize the social universe. I believe that a very strong 
case can also be made that a key factor underlying student unrest was the 
sense that an established channel of access was being restricted by those who 
themselves had but recently achieved political and economic power.12 
There is nothing particularly remarkable in the association of social 
and political elites with the instruments of learning. The Spanish case 
though, is sufficiently different from others that may come to mind, such as 
the Ox bridge system or the mandarinate of the gran des ecoles, to justify some 
explanation. Historically, modernizing states have espoused policies designed 
to broaden the base of education and to provide the products of this education 
with suitable employment, whether in the private or public sectors. However, 
the capacity of the Spanish state to meet either goal has usually been quite 
restricted. 
Undoubtedly, a major reason for these failures and shortcomings was 
, 
the extreme poverty of the country during much of the past century and a half. 
Although there were important regional differences in living standards, the 
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overall situation was one of economic fragility and political insecurity, both 
making for a state chronically short of money. At the same time, since these 
conditions functioned to limit career opportunities for the educated, some of 
the slack -- as in many contemporary third world countries -- had by necessity 
to be taken up by the state. We thus find that significant numbers of the middle 
class made their living (badly) as state employees, the inflated size of the officer 
corps being but one of the best known examples of this phenomenon.13 
These matters are directly pertinent to education. The Spanish state 
began to define a major role for itself in education during the nineteenth 
century when its resources to carry out effective educational policies were most 
limited. It also attempted to do so in general opposition to the church, which 
had an especially strong hold over secondary instruction. Control over the 
universities was a critical issue. In the rather distant past, Spanish 
universities had enjoyed an international reputation as centers of learning. 
But by the nineteenth century, these institutions were clearly in decline and 
had also ceased to be self-regulating entities. For Spanish leaders pondering 
the dismal state of their society and the need for what they termed "moral 
regeneration," the university seemed to offer the chance of training the elite 
necessary to modernize Spain. What type of university? Given the 
circumstances, the state would have to play a directing role. As Carr (1982: 
237) has noted, 
The lamentable state of the professorate ... and the indifference 
of society made the autonomous university of Germany or 
England an intellectual and administrative impossibility. 
Without state supervision a private 'free' university system 
would have been dominated by the strongest force in society 
-- the Church. 
It is from this period that much of the contemporary educational 
structure -- and a good deal of rhetoric -- derives. The organizational model for 
education was borrowed from France and it transformed all teachers in public 
institutions into civil servants. Positions in the educational system were to be 
filled by oposiciones, public competitive examinations which functioned as the 
final step in the selective process (there were typically more candidates with 
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formal qualifications than available openings). This system was first applied to 
university positions in 1845 and later extended to all teachers in the state 
system. It remains in place today, little altered, as a key component of the 
current Ley General de Educaci6n, the General Education Law of 1970. 
Oposiciones were initially established as part of a liberal reform 
measure designed to provide objective criteria for recruitment and 
promotion. What could hardly have been foreseen at the time was the degree to 
which such a system lent itself not only to abuses of formalism but, as 
was notably the case during the Franco dictatorship, to operating as a 
mechanism of ideological control. By their very nature, oposiciones tend to 
select for a particular type of knowledge. In the words of a recent report, 
These examinations stress memory and verbal skills, they 
have a limited theoretical component, and are distant from 
reality; and ... they in no way measure the professional 
capacity of the candidate. In the exercises, much weight is 
given to content, very little to professional background, 
and none at all to practical knowledge (Lopez 1986:55). 
Whatever may be said in favor of the process (such as security of 
tenure, professional identity, and protection from local pressure groups), the 
system is obviously one more likely to value received knowledge than to 
stimulate innovation -- problems that most of the teachers I know readily 
acknowledge and would dearly like to see eliminated. 
In part, no doubt, because of these shortcomings and rigidities, new 
educational ideas generally flourished more successfully in independent 
institutions. This was certainly the case with the Instituci6n Libre de 
Ensefianza, the Free Institute of Education, founded in Madrid in 1875. Until 
the Civil War brought its operations to an end, it represented the most serious 
and consistent attempt to offer non-dogmatic and non-official education. It 
stressed-- somewhat on the English public school model-- the formation of 
"character" rather than the assimilation of a fixed body of traditional 
' knowledge, and encouraged students to learn by experience through field 
trips, technical training, courses in art and folklore, sports, and evenmanual 
labor. The Instituci6n's teaching methods were not easily translatable into 
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mass education, but its total approach to education, and its philosophy of 
treating children with due consideration and respect for their moral and 
intellectual personalities, influenced the thinking of generations of 
progressive teachers. I would agree with Linz (1978: 175) that the Instituci6n 
and other reformist educational associations and institutions helped to mold a 
liberal, rational, and humanistic political and educational ethos; it is certainly 
true that teachers and professors were among the strongest supporters of the 
Republic.14 
In Catalonia, progressive educational programs were developed not 
only by several private institutions (Maria Montessori established a school in 
Barcelona after fleeing from fascist Italy), but by the Generalitat and 
municipal authorities, in particular the Barcelona city government. Official 
support for education reflected the willingness of Catalan authorities to 
allocate substantial resources to education, and a recognition on the part of 
these bodies that the maintenance of Catalan national identity was linked to 
the schools. I have been informed by numerous individuals, including past 
and present officials, that the quality of public primary schooling was probably 
higher in Catalonia than in any comparable jurisdiction elsewhere in Spain, 
an assessment that finds documentary support in the reports of Franco 
bureaucrats engaged in the "purification" (depuraci6n) of education after the 
Civil War.15 
What we have up to the late 1930s is an educational situation of some 
complexity, but whose main outlines are clear enough. In the context of a 
badly underfunded educational system, the state allocated the bulk of its 
resources to the two ends of the continuum: primary education and university, 
thus leaving secondary education essentially in private, mostly clerical, 
hands. Also, those who could afford it, enrolled their children in private 
primary schools. This division of education by class was much the same in 
Catalonia as elsewhere in Spain, granted the superiority of its primary, 
obligatory, educational system, some excellent private secular schools,_and 
probably a higher degree of class mobility (a function of industrial 
development) than that found in most other parts of Spain. 
At its best, Spanish education produced cultured, at time brilliant, 
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individuals who were intellectually at home in several worlds and were not 
constrained by disciplinary boundaries.l6 But it was indubitably an education 
designed for the few. When, in the 1930s, the Republic did undertake to change 
and broaden the educational system, it was frustrated by economic constraints 
intensified by the global crisis, internal dissension and, finally, by the triumph 
of reaction and fascism in the Civil War. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION 
The present structure of education is an outgrowth of changes 
undertaken in the late 1960s and the early 1970s to modernize the system and 
provide a better technical fit between education and a developing market 
economy. What we should understand is that by this time the attempts of the 
early Franco regime to impose a distinctly "national-Catholic" educational 
model had failed.l7 They had done so because the ideology and values which 
such a model encapsulated -- a stress on the "singularity" of Spain and its 
"universal mission"; the claims that the regime was the legitimate heir to a 
glorious past of saints and soldiers -- were clearly anachronistic. Also, such 
an orientation hardly fitted the image of the consumer society touted by the 
technocrats of the period. 
It is pertinent to take note here of some of the recommendations made 
in 1963 by the mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Mter observing that only about 15 percent of the children of 
secondary school age were attending school, it called for both an increase in 
numbers and a shift in the direction of improved technical training: "The 
training of highly skilled workmen and the middle range of technicians (such 
as assistant engineers, farm and works managers, accountants and the like) 
requires a good general secondary education ... supplemented by specialized 
training" (The Economic Development of Spain 1963:393). By 1971, the Third 
Plan of Economic Development was projecting almost a tripling of secondary 
education in five years (Ill Plan de Desarrollo 1971:36). In the course of these 
shifts, much of the explicit ideological content of education was scrapped or 
very substantially toned down. Thus, by the time the General Law of Education 
was approved in 1970, formal indoctrination was reduced to such banalities as 
"understanding the values and potentialities of the political doctrine of the 
National Movement," a system defined as the "most appropriate to Spanish 
reality" (Ley General de Educaci6n 1976:667).18 Fundamentally, what seems to 
have taken place is an abandonment by the regime of serious efforts to use the 
schools for purposes of political mobilization. In the process, no alternative 
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ideological model entered the picture (at least not officially), and education was 
treated essentially as if it were devoid of political content.19 
In some respects, therefore, the educational philosophy of the terminal 
years of the regime was something of a throwback to "traditional" models of 
class education with the added element of an orientation (more than specific 
technical instruction) designed to socialize the student to the totalizing forces 
of technocracy or, using the language of the times, learning to live in the 
context of"a universal civilization" ofwhich "the West will probably form the 
base" (Ley General de Educaci6n 1976:661-662). 
Pre-university education (leaving aside preschool) was-- and 
essentially continues to be -- organized on the basis of eight years of Basic 
General Education (Educaci6n General Basica, or EGB), which is obligatory 
and typically terminates at some point in the student's fourteenth year. Mter 
EGB, there are two streams of non-obligatory secondary education 
(ensefianzas medias), one leading towards university, the other being 
somewhat akin to trade or vocational school. The first, and clearly the much 
more important and prestigious option, is made up of two phases: the 
bachillerato (or, to give it its full title and acronym, Bachillerato Unificado 
Polivalente, or BUP), lasting three years, followed by a year of university 
preparation, the Curso de Orientaci6n Universitaria, or COU. The other path, 
lasting anything from two to five years, is known as Formaci6n Profesional, or 
FP [Fig. 2]. To simplify matters, and given that this is a state-wide structure, I 
have opted for the Castilian [Spanish] terminology; equivalent Catalan terms 
("batxillerat," "formaci6 professional," etc.) are standard in most schools and 
are used in Catalan government publications and directives, as well as in 
pedagogy. I have kept the Catalan cognates when quoting Catalan sources. 
Historically, the pivotal element in this system has been the 
bachillerato, the series of courses providing a liberal arts exposure and an 
avenue to university careers. The bachillerato has undergone changes over the 
years (and, as we shall see, more are in the making), but fundamentally it can 
· be thought of as a vehicle for instilling what some now term "cultural literacy" 
(Hirsch 1987; Cheney 1987). The stress has been on humanistic education with 
an emphasis on language, literature, history, mathematics, geography, and 
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general science. 
In some respects, the curriculum (and the teaching) clearly 
accomplish the intended educational mission. Courses in language and 
literature deal directly with a corpus of knowledge (major literary works, 
techniques of textual analysis, etc.) and the quality of foreign language 
training is generally of a high order. I was not a little surprised, for example, 
to find that many BUP students in Catalonia can function with some ease in 
four languages: they are fully bilingual in Catalan and Castilian (and control 
the relevant core literatures), and often understand and have some speaking 
knowledge of two other languages, typically English and French. All three 
years of the current BUP include a history/geography-cum social world 
component, the first year being devoted to a "history of civilizations" course, 
the second to a general course on human geography and global economy, and 
the third and final year to a course on the geography and history of Spain, 
sometimes including also other Hispanic countries. Each course runs for a 
year, and there are at least three other years of history-geography at the EGB 
level. The university preparatory COU year, which really should be thought of 
as a fourth year ofBUP, addresses more specialized topics, for example 
demography or economic history. Altogether, this adds up to some six or seven 
years of history and related topics in the course of twelve years of school, a 
degree of coverage that compares very favorably with the three or four years of 
history which most American schoolchildren are exposed to during their 
primary and secondary education (The New York Times, August 31, 1987). 
The system, though, is beset by a variety of problems and shortcomings. 
As much else in present day Spain, education is a product of political 
compromise. In the early post-Franco period, the demand ofthe parties ofthe 
left was for the creation of la escuela publica unica -- a unified system of public 
education.20 For reasons both political and economic, these expectations had to 
be scaled back to a substantial degree of state involvement in the supervision of 
private education (Gunther 1987:49). The trade-off for these supervisory 
functions was state economic support for private education. Today, nearly all 
private schools, about half of them religious, receive public funding, and it is 
difficult to see how such a system can easily alter what the Minister of 
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Education has himself termed the "intergenerational transmission of · ,. · 
privilege" (Maravall1987:75). 
Currently, some 69 percent ofEGB schools in Spain {including· 
Catalonia) are public, while the figure for Catalonia is 50.5 percent. With 
respect to secondary education (BUP and COU), the breakdown at the state 
level is 51.8 percent private and 48.2 percent public (Darder 1987:20;L6pez 
1986:74; Anuario El Pais 1988:162). Private secondary education plays an even 
more important role in Catalonia. 
This is a very high proportion of private primary and secondary schools 
in the total system, which is not to deny the important changes that have taken 
place in education in the course of the last generation. ·Today, virtually every 
child in Spain receives a primary (EGB) education and the proportion of 
students enrolled in secondary school (BUP, COU and FP) has more than 
doubled in two decades to a figure well within the range of other industrial 
market economies. Levels of university enrollment are also comparable to 
those typical of Western European countries (World Development Report 
1987:263). These positive developments may obscure a number of structural 
problems which include high dropout rates (28 percent of those who begin EGB 
do not finish it; 22 percent do not finish BUP), 12-15 percent ofhigh school 
students failing year-end examinations, and perhaps half of the current EGB 
population not continuing into secondary education (El Pais Educaci6n, 
February 17, 1987, July 28, 1987; Diari de Barcelona, April1, 1987, April9, 
1987). Also, the split at fourteen-plus between those going on to the bachillerato 
and those who finish their education at this point or enter trade schools 
reinforces segmentation by class and the assumption, as one of my Teachers' 
College informants phrased it, that "bright kids do the batxillerat and dumb 
ones have no choice but formaci6 professional."21 
It is in recognition of some of these problems that the educational · 
system is undergoing a substantial overhaul. The most important element of 
this change (designed in part to bring Spanish education more in line with 
' that of other European Community countries) is the phased extension, in the 
course of the next decade, of obligatory education to sixteen-plus years. As 
currently envisaged, primary education will be followed by two "cycles" of 
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secondary education, the first from approximately age 12 to 14, the second from 
14 to 16. It is also expected that by the year 2000 fully 80 percent of the 
school-age population will be continuing their studies until their eighteenth 
year (El Pais, June 17, 1987; Avui, February 10, 1987). This reform is intended 
to provide a common core of secondary education for all children and thus 
break the distinction between students following the bachillerato path (strongly 
linked to an inherited system of values) and those leaving after EGB or 
entering FP institutes. The political and social dimension of the reform was 
well expressed by one of the professors at the Sant Cugat Teachers• College: 
One of our longstanding and most important demands 
(revindicacions) is what we term "el tronc cornu" ["common 
trunk,"i.e. core curriculum], until sixteen or so, following 
which we can have diversification and specialization, but 
on the foundation of a common base of education. In short, 
we are trying to put together -- the specialists, the Generalitat, 
the teachers -- a structure of education, covering the years 
12 to 16, that provides children with a common, shared, 
experience. 22 
This process is already underway. By 1987, some 200 schools (32 of them 
in Catalonia) were experimenting with the new structure and the new 
curriculum (Diari de Barcelona, April9, 1987; El Pais Educaci6n, May 31, 
1987). The new curricular arrangement is considerably more flexible than the 
old one and allows, in Catalonia at least, for up to 40 percent of elective 
courses. Also, the goal is to offer not one bachillerato, but the choice of about 
half a dozen (general, human and social sciences, technical-industrial, etc). 
Perhaps even more important is the recognition on the part of educational 
planners that a primary function of schooling should be the provision not just 
of skills, or even the transmission of a corpus of knowledge, but the 
engendering of attitudes and values designed to facilitate an on-going process 
of"learning to learn" (Coll1986:9-10, 20-21).23 
I did not have the opportunity to visit any of these experimental schools, 
but I interviewed several educators and they are well aware that earlier 
programs of reform were short lived and that the present system has critical 
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defects. Their willingness to work for change cannot be doubted. I am only 
echoing some recognized shortcomings -- which mesh with my own 
assessments -- if I point out that both the "culture" of education and its 
disciplinary structure will require a major overhaul. It is difficult, for 
example, to propose serious programs (at any educational level) of cultural 
diversity when, to cite but one revealing instance, in the whole of Spain there is 
but a single professor (non-tenured) of Far Eastern art (El Pais Educaci6n, 
May 3, 1987). What we have, therefore, is a teaching profession that, while 
generally disposed to broaden its horizons, has been little exposed to fields and 
approaches outside the traditional disciplines.24 Discussing this matter with a 
teacher, I received the following assessment: 
The truth of the matter is that we have not been trained to 
teach the realities of an increasingly complex world. Our 
education is solid, but very textual and very much within 
the European tradition. We simply don't have the tools to 
handle with much authority such matters as African 
cultures or the civilizations of the Orient. 
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CHAPrERV 
THE CONTEXT OF LEARNING 
Shifting our attention from educational structures and plans of reform 
to the observed context of teaching/learning, I first want to consider -- in a very 
general way-- the attitudes, values, and cultural constructs that teachers and 
students bring to the classroom and how these help to define the nature and 
shape of discourse. Following these introductory paragraphs, I will say 
something about the four schools in which I worked. 
One of the first issues often raised by American colleagues when 
discussing Spanish education is the matter of authority, the assumption often 
being that in the aftermath of the Franco regime, and following a long history 
of clerical influence, the learning environment must perforce be heavily 
authoritarian. The situation turns out to be considerably different, certainly 
more complex. In my experience, teachers -- most of them young, most of 
them female -- exercise a degree of moral and intellectual authority rare in the 
classrooms of America. The message, however, is much less one of control 
than of mentoring and intellectual initiation. There is certainly no 
presumption of a hypothetical equality between child and teacher/adult (I 
heard one teacher say, "This classroom will not be turned into a republic of 
children"), but this distinction, it is assumed, is grounded in a differential of 
knowledge and experience. One teacher, in the context of the aforementioned 
student strikes, put the matter of authority and intellect thus to her class: 
It is very natural for youth to question authority. If you did 
not do so I would worry. But rebel, go to the streets, as 
intelligent human beings, not just out of anger and frustration. 
If you want to fight oppression, you will be much better served 
if you understand how oppressive systems work. There are no 
short cuts. 
The teacher in question had been involved in all manner of anti-regime 
activities during the dictatorship and she felt that ignorance had been used as 
a powerful instrument of social control. Her outlook reflects this experience, 
but also something that I encountered many times over: an almost 
31 
Enlightenment faith in the power of reason. Phrased differently, teachers view 
themselves as guardians of minds, and in this domain they do not have to 
compete with other professionals, such as administrators, counselors, or 
school psychologists, categories which are virtually non-existent in the 
Spanish educational context. It appears to be a system that -- at its best --
balances authority with a recognition that such authority is a temporary 
mandate, and that an important element of this mandate is to stimulate 
intellectual (and less explicitly, human) growth. In the many weeks I spent 
attending classes, I witnessed numerous discussions -- some quite heated --
between advanced students (BUP and COU) and teachers, but never a single 
conflict, a single disciplinary problem. Obviously, the educational process 
socializes children to internalize a particular model of interaction discourse 
that is liberal in content but also respects intellectual authority. 
If teachers are not exactly the martinets that some might expect them 
to be, students are hardly without voice. As we have seen, the demands of 
secondary school students can be powerful enough to be felt at the highest 
levels of government, a social and political datum of some importance. 
Students -- especially those in higher grades -- can, and do, organize for a 
variety of purposes -- social, recreational, and political. Furthermore, the 
educational model tends to grant legitimacy to what are perceived to be valid 
complaints, such as excessive homework assignments (I recorded several 
instances of negotiated homework). 
Even more significant (although open to several interpretations) have 
been a series of shifts in youth behavior and attitudes during the past 15-20 
years. These changes are most evident outside the school, particularly in 
leisure/discretionary activity, and are manifested in both group and individual 
behavior. Young people ofboth sexes tend to form part of small groups (colles 
in Catalan) defined by common interests and ideologies, frequenting 
particular locales (bars, discos, cafes), and often identifiable by dress or other 
visible markers. We might note here that school classes generally move as an 
age-grade through the academic sequence, a circumstance that tends to 
reinforce identity and solidarity. Clearly, organizations of this type can 
function as a defense against authority and help define a variety of alternative 
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styles oflife (Feixa 1986:14-15). It is also relevant that these activities begin in 
the early teens and that teenagers in Spain do not have to concern themselves 
with such matters as drinking age regulations. Not least among these 
. changes have been significant transformations in sexual attitudes and 
behavior, changes of sufficient magnitude to make an impact on the 
educational system.25 
I would be loath to give the impression that there is something in Spain 
that can neatly be summed up as a "youth culture," but there is no doubt in my 
mind that the young people of today find it perfectly natural to examine and 
question what we tend to think of as established values. As a case in point, I 
participated -- as an informant on the mysteries of American society -- in a 
class discussion of the American political scandal of the moment, the Gary 
Hart affair. Sixteen- and seventeen-year-aids ofboth sexes found it puzzling 
and remarkable ("If I were Gary Hart, I would not have allowed them to 
interrogate me," "What a strange country, all this concern with the sexual life 
ofpoliticians.") that private and personal acts should have such an impact on 
the political process.26 But, above all, they were shocked at the indignity of the 
proceedings and the brutal invasiveness of press and public. Responses of this 
type are in keeping with what we know from other sources respecting behavior 
and attitude. A recent city-funded survey of youth in Barcelona (both working 
and in school) indicates that what they value most are honesty, responsibility, 
liberty, and equality (Funes i Artiaga 1985:195). In a binary test of attitudes and 
practices, some 75 percent of young people regarded corruption and hard 
drugs as "more inexcusable," but 85 percent viewed abortion as "more 
tolerable" -- a rating of disapproval similar to that assigned to riding the train 
without a ticket (Funes i Artiaga 1985:197). Evidently, the youth of today bring 
to the classroom ideas and values that are hardly orthodox, although I would 
argue that they are derived primarily from a Western contestatatorial 
tradition, on which has been superimposed more contemporary-- mostly 
European -- forms and styles.27 
A number of elements and features of the instructional environment, 
besides the ones already discussed, are so general and pervasive that they are 
bound to influence the very meaning of knowledge. Any visitor to Spain 
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(certainly anyone who uses public transportation at the appropriate hours) 
cannot fail to notice the collections of large and complex notebooks, files, 
and binders that all students -- from the higher elementary grades to 
university -- carry with them. These books contain dictations, abstracts, 
homework assignments, and lists of suggested study materials, but most of 
all, "notes" (apunts in Catalan). How important these are to students, and 
what use is made of them, may not be immediately apparent. I learned in due 
course that the loss of apunts, as happened to a student in a third year BUP 
class, is regarded as a calamity. To appreciate why this is so, requires that we 
understand the extent to which particular types of knowledge continues to be 
orally transmitted. At times, this transmission is explicit and closely 
monitored, with teachers indicating what pieces of information are vital and 
should be written down, and students being asked to read back the pertinent 
facts and concepts. 
Obviously, the taking of notes is a common feature of all systems of 
formal education. With respect to Spain, though, it is no exaggeration to 
maintain that notes acquire a quasi-magical quality. They are knowledge of a 
particular type -- the logos of the teacher/professor interpreted by the student --
and their primary function is to facilitate the passing of examinations. "Good" 
notes are a valuable commodity and move through a distribution network that 
includes exchange, photocopying, textual comparison and, at the university 
level, cash sale. 
The importance given to notes is related to several other aspects of the 
educational system. Perhaps most manifestly, apunts are linked to a pedagogy 
that continues to stress memorization. That such an approach functions to 
enshrine the magisterial words of the instructor is evident and was was 
remarked on by several educators.28 Less obvious is the linkage to a paucity of 
other sources of information, in particular libraries. With the single exception 
of the elite school"Magna" (see below), all other institutions I worked in had 
very limited collections, and these were usually accessible for only a few hours 
· a week. I asked several students what sources and materials they used in 
writing papers and assignments; in virtually all instances the answer came 
down to a combination of textbook and notes, although some mentioned 
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periodicals and encyclopedias. One of my teacher respondents commented, 
It is really very difficult, Oriol, for my advanced students to 
do anything that resembles historical research. The in-school 
facilities are limited, the Municipal Historical Institute is not 
open to schoolchildren, and the Biblioteca de Catalunya --
supposedly the premier public library in Catalonia --.is 
understaffed, poorly organized, and has but one copier that 
is often out of order. 
This poverty of resources (my enquiries about the availability of 
audiovisual aids were commonly attributed a humor that was not intended) 
has much to do with funding and staffing: the number of schools has grown, 
as have the number of teachers, but there is a shortage of specialists and 
support personnel. Similarly, money for libraries, materials, and athletic 
equipment is often very scarce. Of course, the situation is generally worse in 
public schools. What we have, therefore, are conditions that tend to reinforce a 
restricted vision of knowledge, even when the formal and explict educational 
goals stress openness and teachers support these aims. It is interesting to 
observe here that one of the major complaints voiced by students is that 
education is too abstract and theoretical, some claiming that its only real 
utility is that it trains one for taking examinations. 
In order to facilitate a degree of generalization respecting education, I 
looked for a mix of schools that reflected at least some of the most obvious 
socioeconomic variables found in Barcelona. As is usually the case with 
anthropological research, the final selection was as much a result of 
institutional access as of research design. I had no intention, for both ethical 
and practical reasons, of conducting research in any school or classroom 
whose teachers were not willing and happy to have me in their midst. I also 
explained the project to students and told them that their cooperation was 
strictly voluntary. The end result was a selection of schools which, while 
hardly representative statistically, nevertheless offered a reasonable 
distribution. As is common in such cases, I have assigned them 
pseudonyms.29 
The sample, I recognize, is limited, both in terms of number and 
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locality. Also, it is very likely that the schools in question are either especially 
open and innovative or very secure in their educational mission. We also have 
to keep in mind some specifically Catalan concerns (and the strong supporting 
role of Catalan political institutions in education) that give all education in 
Catalonia a distinct dimension. But granted these provisos -- and I might also 
add here that none of the schools are church-affiliated -- I believe that the 
overall situation described is similar to that found in other major urban 
locations. 
Granted that the methodology had to be tailored to fit temporal, spatial, 
and political constraints -- two of the schools experienced severe closures and 
disruptions due to strikes and student unrest-- I nevertheless believe that the 
range of experince (which included interviews with university faculty, 
teachers from other institutions, students attending other schools, and friends 
with children in other schools) was broad enough for the purposes of the 
research. 
Escuela Publica Valle Inclan. "Valle Inclan" is a public kindergarden 
and general education (EGB) establishment serving a working class 
neighborhood in one of the industrial towns of Barcelona's "red belt." The 
population is predominantly Castilian-speaking, much of it originally from 
Andalusia and Extremadura. Since the early eighties, migration from 
southern Spain has slowed down dramatically and today about 50 percent of 
the inhabitants were born in Catalonia. It is claimed by some authorities 
(mainly on the basis of surveys) that the majority of the population now 
understands Catalan; this may be the case, but even a short sojourn in this 
district is sufficient to make evident that the language of home and street is 
Castilian. Indeed, the neighborhood exhibits, particularly during the warm 
months, something of the air and style of small-town southern Spain. While 
children learn some Catalan in the school, and read Catalan texts without too 
much difficulty, Castilian is their language of choice in and out of school. The 
children who attend "Valle Inchin" form part of a numerous, important-- and 
· relatively understudied -- segment of the population of Catalonia. One of the 
reasons I was interested in visiting this school was to see whether the dual 
factors ofworking class background and immigrant origin might in some 
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measure influence the perceptions of children respecting those positioned on 
the margins of society. 
Magna. If"Valle Inchin" is a school whose pupils are virtually all. 
drawn from the working class, "Magna" represents the other end of the 
socioeconomic spectrum. This is an expensive private school, of modern 
functional architecture, set in one of Barcelona's most exclusive residential 
neighborhoods. It teaches the whole curriculum from EGB to COD and enjoys 
the reputation of being highly selective in the pupils it accepts: only the very 
brightest and those who show great promise. More than anything else, it is a 
school on the continental model where quite young students quickly learn --
one notices it already in fourteen-year-olds --that education is serious business 
and that individual success is very important in getting ahead. Children who 
do poorly are flagged for special attention; if performance continues below par, 
they are regretfully asked to leave. Students come from family backgrounds 
that range from the comfortably well-to-do to the very rich. Most are 
Catalan-speakers, but there are also quite a number of Castilian-speaking 
pupils as well as some children of resident foreigners. Virtually all the 
teaching is in Catalan. A teacher who knows the school well attributes its 
reputation to selectivity combined with a clearly defined educational 
philosophy: "Parents who send their children to "Magna" know exactly what 
they are getting-- a French-style education in an elite environment." 
Escola Santa Eulalia. "Sta. Eulalia," as its name suggests, was 
formerly a religious school. About ten years ago, the parents' association 
negotiated with the religious order to cede the school to them. This was 
accomplished, but at the cost of a substantial burden of debt assumed by the 
school and the new trustees. The school is something of an organizational 
anomaly with grades from kindergarden through EGB being public, while 
BDP and COD are private. "Sta. Eulalia" forms part of CEPEPC, an 
educational collective that is pressing for the integration of member schools 
into the system of Generalitat-supported public education. 30 CEPEPC 
philosophy calls for quality public education high in both Catalan content and 
community involvement. In common with most other CEPEPC schools, "Sta. 
Eulalia" students are dra~n chiefly from a culturally-conscious middle class 
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that identifies itself as Catalan and politically progressive. It is manifestly an 
institution in the tradition of Catalan reformist education and reflects the 
educational and social agendas of a politically and demographically important 
component of the population of Catalonia. The school itself is housed on three 
crowded floors and an extensive basement of a relatively modern highrise in a 
solid, if hardly elegant, turn-of- the-century section of downtown Barcelona. 
Institut Ausias March. My experience at "Ausias March" was limited 
in duration and of a somewhat specialized nature. I was invited to visit the 
institute, a modern public secondary school, by a faculty member at the 
Teachers' College (Autonomous University of Barcelona) who enjoys an 
arrangement permitting her to use it for the practical training of her 
education students. These internships take the form of mini-courses in which 
half a dozen university trainees first participate in a two-hour methods 
seminar and then spend about the same amount of time practice teaching BUP 
students. Obviously, this is not a standard class situation, but it was 
interesting and instructive to observe how the next generation of teachers are 
being trained. Also, the BUP students with whom they work represent a rather 
heterogeneous group, mostly, but not exclusively, middle class, and perhaps 
evenly split between those of Catalan cultural origin and those whose parents 
or grandparents originally hailed from other parts of Spain. This mix no doubt 
reflects the fact that the institute is a public school -- thus reasonably accessible 
-- in a town which lacks the range of educational options found in Barcelona. It 
is also a school with a certain reputation for excellence, which no doubt 
explains why it is used for teacher training. The language of instruction in the 
course I attended, and apparently most other courses, is Catalan. 
My time was not distributed evenly among these four schools. Two 
schools, "Sta. Eulalia" and "Valle Inclan," represented between them close to 
two-thirds of the hours I actually spent in classrooms. The reason for this 
apportionment was mainly logistical (distance and relative complexity in 
arranging visits), but also to some degree a matter of choice: the more I 
worked in the above two institutions, the better I got to know and understand 
students and teachers. In short, a dynamic of increasing returns came into 
play. As previously noted, student political actions made it necessary to work 
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in a very flexible manner. 
In this section, I have tried to indicate that a number of significant 
cleavages, ambiguities, and contradictions are discernible in the general 
context of education. The major problem, I would argue, is a certain 
dissonance between educational ideals and what we may term the everyday 
culture ofleaming. Most evidently, students find themselves in an 
environment strongly influenced by liberal values, but must also come to terms 
with an instructional system that generally places great emphasis on the 
student's capacity to internalize a given body of knowledge and reproduce it on 
demand. Also, as was pointed out to me more than once, students tend to look 
for the answer, while many secondary school teachers handle classroom 
instruction in a manner more appropriate to university lecturing, a situation 
that makes for what one teacher referred to as "one-directional teaching." In 
short, students are not so much participants in a learning process, as 
recipients of knowledge. 
Altogether, such a model oflearning is likely to emphasize individual 
goals over collective ones and, at another level, corporate interests -- those of 
the student body -- over wider societal concerns. The system simply does not 
put much stress on the broad educational benefits of cooperation and 
teamwork, nor is it generally structured to reward activities of this type. 
Students are not barred from raising issues in class, but discussions generally 
take place between an individual student and the teacher; what the 
educational ethos lacks-- at least at the pre-university level-- is a reasonably 
well-established and integrative tradition of debate. Students, to be, sure, 
generate their own collective forms of activity, but these are mostly 
extracurricular; in the specific context of education, a much more Hobbesian 
ethic is the norm. 
Once more, these shortcomings do not go unrecognized by teachers and 
other educational personnel, and I witnessed some efforts (generally not 
terribly successful) to introduce new elements in the structure oflearning.31 
Such innovations, however, can do little to relieve the enormous pressure, 
especially at the BUP and COU levels, to gear instruction to university 
entrance requirements. These exams, we should remember, determine not 
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only access to the university, but also the career options that will be open to the 
entering student. It seems reasonable to assume that a secondary school 
education so driven by future career concerns is not the ideal vehicle for 
stimulating critical thinking about society and one's place in it. Needless to 
say, this is not a problem confined to the Spanish educational system. 
A final stress factor-- one that generally goes unrecognized and that 
warrants more attention than we can give to it here -- entails competing 
demands for finite blocks of time. The matter is complex, but includes 
problems of general time-management and a cultural system with quite rigid 
and time-absorbing social obligations. Throughout my notes, I find mention of 
how both teachers and students complain rather constantly oflack of time and 
lack of sleep and of how difficult it is to keep up to schedule. The particular 
conditions of the year I conducted fieldwork, most obviously the sequence of 
strikes and demonstrations, no doubt added to the pressures. The issue, 
though, is much more general, and involves cultural priorities that are bound 
to limit the time and effort that can be allocated to study in the course of the 
school year. 
CHAPTER VI 
INTERPRETING THE PAST 
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More than in most modern literate societies, the past in Catalonia is 
potentially treacherous territory. Some of the reasons why this is so have 
already been mentioned and, as indicated, much of the problem stems from 
the the absence of a clear closure to the events and experiences of the first three 
quarters of the present century. What we can say with some assurance is that 
nothing approaching a public myth has emerged to explain and give 
contemporary significance to this conflictive era. The general failure to 
confront the recent past has not gone unremarked by professional historians, a 
recent editorial in the leading journal of contemporary history noting that the 
fiftieth anniversary of the termination of the Civil War has slipped by almost 
without notice, a phenomenon attributed to "the still painful memories of lived 
experience" and to the circumstance that "those events of the Civil War 
implicate everyone in one form or another, and the protagonists have names 
well known within each family and each neighborhood" (Veneer la Memoria 
1989:5). Observations of the same order were offered by a sociologist who has 
carried out research among schoolchildren and young adults. In her opinion, 
"The vocabulary of common political parlance has virtually done away with 
Franco, barely known to most children, and Fascism, generally referred to as 
'the antecedent regime' or 'before democracy."' She felt that young people had 
a most limited understanding of the past and that schools made little effort to 
link the present to the historical events and conditions that had shaped it.32 
This is a problem common to all of Spain, but it has a special 
significance for Catalonia given that the emergence of a modern, politicized, 
national identity is inextricably tied to the turbulent decades of the first half of 
the century. Thus, while for all Spaniards the period carries a similar burden 
of pain, only in Catalonia is it imbued with such a powerful charter 
significance. It is altogether remarkable, therefore, that so great a degree of 
historical amnesia continues to be the norm in Catalonia. The price paid is 
undoubtedly high. The treatment accorded to this period -- conflictive, but also 
formative -- provides valuable insights on how other problematic historical 
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episodes are managed. 
History textbooks, especially those designed for the basic education 
(EGB) curriculum, are particularly anodyne. In two commonly used texts 
written for the last year of compulsory education (Grup Promotor 1984; Equipo 
Aula 3 1985), the Civil War, its causes, and its aftermath, is covered in 
approximately ten pages, with at least half of this space being devoted to 
illustrations, maps, charts, definitions, and timelines; needless to say, this 
leaves little room for exposition. In both books, the text seems to aim at a 
"balance," the underlying message being that those were indeed terrible times, 
but that they are now safely behind us. 33 What one does not find is some, 
however rudimentary, attempt at commentary and explanation. Instead, there 
are descriptions of such matters as battles and their outcomes and of the 
political/sectoral composition of the opposing sides. 
This putatively non-controversial approach is followed in a number of 
the books utilized in secondary education. Some older texts still in use present 
the Civil War as something of an unfortunate precondition for the 
establishment of an ordered political system that would, in due course, give 
rise to new and appropriate institutional forms (Centeno et al. 1977:339-355). 
Virtually all texts are in agreement that not only was the war bloody and 
destructive, but that its duration was quite unexpected: "a civil war, which, 
against all expectations, lasted three years" (Balanza et al. 1986:298); a 
military uprising that should have "rapidly brought down the Republican 
government" (Centeno et al. 1977:339). 
Without much more in the way of interpretation, statements of this type 
implicitly reinforce the notion that the Civil War was, to a considerable degree, 
the result of poor judgment, even bad luck. What really calls for explanation is 
why a military coup-- the classic Spanish pronunciamiento --failed so 
dismally. A fundamental reason, as one of the more recent texts makes clear, 
is that in the Spain of 1936, unlike that of the previous century, the military 
rebels faced a substantial population ready to resist the takeover -- "thousands 
· of peasants and workers organized into powerful unions and parties, and an 
important sector of the middle class (some even from the army) who had also 
rallied to the democratic project" (Garcia 1986:336). The value of such an 
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interpretation lies in the fact that the student is directed to the analysis of 
social and political processes; in a word, is asked to think. A good teacher 
might also address the very definite political and institutional weaknesses of 
the Republic-- a gradual breakdown in democracy that had its parallels in 
other European societies -- and the particular vulnerability of the Spain of the 
times to foreign pressures and intervention. 
The majority of texts, however, do not follow such an approach, and I 
suspect that the primary reason is that ultimately it calls for some judgment 
or evaluation, something that goes beyond the pronouncement that the war 
was an awful tragedy that should never be repeated. Furthermore, most books 
are hardly bias-free. In the absence of a deeper examination than is commonly 
encountered, the contrast between the war-torn past and the peaceful present 
echoes in muted tones the old claims of Franco that he alone brought peace to 
Spain.34 Finally, we might note that most texts are multi-authored (as many 
as half a dozen contributors), and that this too may help account for some o[ 
the blandness of style and problems of approach. 
Almost any text, regardless of its shortcomings, can function as a point 
of departure for purposes of discussion. This, though, is too infrequently 
attempted. My notes from the end of March (almost two months into the 
project) give some sense ofhow I saw the the classroom environment: 
By now I notice a particular style of teaching/learning that 
places a good deal of stress on copying and memorizing. Facts 
tend to be givens: this happened on such-and-such a date; 
Hitler was an Austrian painter (in [another school] he was. 
spoken of as de brocha gorda -- in short, a house painter --
which misses the frustrated artist in him); there were 
three (or four) main policy objectives to the dictatorship , ' 
of Primo de Rivera [1923-30], and so on .... The problem here 
is that history and society do not appear to be paradoxical, 
contradictory ... 
Certainly, this is not the sole educational model, the only use made of 
textual materials. In another school -- the institut where teacher training 
practicums were taking place ..:.;. the students in the last year of BUP followed 
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up a set of quantitative problems in human geography with the opportunity to 
role-play a "development drama": the impact of highway construction on a 
remote rural area. Students broke up into working groups representing 
distinct interests -- big business, local hotel and store owners, government, 
ecologists, peasants, and so on. The main point of the exercise, according to 
the instructor, was to make them aware that virtually any policy, social or 
economic, impacts on different groups of people in different ways. In the end, 
the students were not only raising cost-benefit questions regarding 
development, but trying to decide what kind of government, of the left or of the 
right, would be most likely to undertake given development policies. 
I am sure that one of the reasons why this particular class became so 
enthusiastic, so involved in its work, is that many of the issues covered had a 
definite immediacy. In contrast, the Civil War appears-- and is often made to 
appear-- so distant in time that connection is difficult. The crux of the 
problem, though, is not so much a generational matter as the difficulty that 
children encounter in putting a human face to those times and events. I came 
to this conclusion on several occasions, once following a discussion on the war 
with a group of seventeen-year-olds. I mentioned to them that, as a child, I had 
spent the first couple of years of the war in the Barcelona, a situation which 
had to be true of other people they knew. My experiences were not particularly 
remarkable and the memory of them was episodic and lacking much in the 
way of context. Still, this small window on the past was sufficient to help give 
the formal knowledge they had acquired a different dimension. I do not believe 
that it was simply the presence of someone who had lived through those times 
that made the difference, but rather that these young people were able to join to 
their school learning a realization that the past was not just something that 
had "gone," but a world inhabited by people who, in some respects at least, 
were quite like themselves. 
When I raised this matter of connection with an educator who is 
working on the current restructuring of the social science curriculun, he 
· agreed that the problems were real and deep-seated. 35 He noted that the texts, 
which he characterized as often "arid," hardly helped the past to come alive, 
and he also observed that in most classes "there is little discourse." He 
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remarked that under these circumstances it was not surprising that children 
who have grown up surrounded by visual images tended to focus on the 
illustrations, but that these, if anything, conspired to reinforce the notion that 
even the recent past was strange and different. Much more important, in his 
opinion, was the severing of the line of oral history transmission linking those 
who had experienced the war and the present school generation. "What causes 
this loss of memory," he went on, "is hard to say exactly; one sees the results 
clearer than the causes." As suggestions, he offered not only the "comfort" of 
avoiding too close a scrutiny of the past, but another possible factor: that in the 
wake of such a long period of deprivation -- political as well as material --
many people in Spain are still trying to catch up with the "good life." 
According to recent reports, the Franco regime has become the stuff of 
fashionable nostalgia for some well-to-do youths, a matter, apparently, much 
more of style than of content or ideology (De la Fuente 1990). 
Interestingly enough, some aspects of the more distant, as distinct 
from the more recent, past do not produce the same degree ofhesitancy, 
ambivalence or distortion. This seems to be true of the treatment accorded to 
rural life in general, whether medieval or pertaining to the last century. I 
attended several classes that dealt with all manner of agrarian issues --
economics, demography, village organization, health, feudal privileges-- and 
found the coverage to be often thorough and discussion quite open. It is also 
worth noting that the Departament d'Ensenyament has funded the publication 
of a fine study guide (really a text in its own right) covering agriculture and 
rural life from the Neolithic to early modern times (Freixenet i Mas et al. 1986). 
This publication not only treats different social systems and organizational 
structures (ancient empires, classical antiquity, feudalism, peasant 
smallholding), but devotes a chapter to change and conflict. This particular 
section, however, is prefaced by the caveat that "during more than five 
thousand years the basic life of the majority of the population underwent very 
little change" (Freixenet i Mas et al. 1986:274). 
I believe it is in part this view ofrurallife as fundamentally static, 
together with the notion that this world is now very distant, that makes for 
relatively uninhibited discussion. It permits a sixteen-year-old girl, as actually 
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happened in one class, to question the teacher at length about droit de seigneur 
("Was the clergy involved?"; "How common was it?"). Perfectly legitimate 
points, but they remind one of the questions often raised in introductory 
anthropology courses respecting the "customs" of this or that society; 
interesting material, to be sure, but does it have much bearing on our life and 
times? Even more recent events, for instance peasant unrest early in the 
present century, are generally seen as belonging to a past that has long 
disappeared. 
That the rural world is viewed in this way is curious since in 1950 as 
much as half of the economically active population of Spain made their living 
from the land, the vast majority as agricultural laborers (United Nations 
1968:135; de Miguel1977:191), and as recently as 1969, more than 30 percent of 
the labor force still followed agricultural pursuits (del Campo 1972). In reality, 
therefore, this agrarian life is not, after all, so temporally removed and must 
have been experienced by the parents and grandparents of quite a number of 
the students (in particular those attending "Valle Inchin") I went to class 
with. 
One does not, however, receive the impression that much from this 
recent past has been transmitted to the present generation. To the extent that 
the country or references to the ancestral village come up in casual school 
conversation, it is generally in the form of nostalgic or romanticized images. 
As for coverage in class, the approach, in the three (two different schools) 
instances that I witnessed, stresses "social problems" without entering into too 
much detail. For example, in a discussion of the vitally important Casas 
Viejas episode, where in 1933 two dozen Anarchist villagers were massacred 
by the Guardia Civil, which in turn led to the downfall of Manuel Azafi.a's 
liberal government, it was not explained that the village formed part of the 
southern latifundia region characterized by chronic underemployment and 
endemic famine. Since, fortunately, very few children in Spain today actually 
go hungry, it would have been valuable to explain what such deprivation does 
· to people, and how it has often been used as a powerful instrument of social 
and political control. I believe that one ofthe reasons why such an approach, 
which must obviously look at poverty in other than purely abstract terms, was 
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eschewed is the fear that detailed discussion of the subject might embarass 
students of modest rural backgrounds. At a deeper level of interpretation, it 
could be argued that what is being communicated, by omission rather than by 
direct reference, is how much better it is to be an urban person than one from 
the country, with all that this change implies not only in terms oflife chances 
but also in terms of cultura.36 In summary, rural life seems to be easier to 
tackle the further away it is from the present, and even relatively recent 
experiences and situations tend to be approached as if quite distant. In some 
respects at least, it is probably fair to say that the wish to forget is akin to that 
surrounding the Civil War.37 
The country, it may be argued, is bound to be an experience of some 
remoteness for present-day city children attending city schools. How do they 
respond to city life and how is the city and its history presented to them? As to 
the first question, there is little doubt that Barcelona schoolchildren are 
consummate cosmopolitans. They are knowledgeable of city geography and , 
often travel long distances from home to school via the network of public 
transportation. The city, except for a very few locations, is not categorized as a 
dangerous environment. As noted previously, by the time they are in their 
middle teens, young people are likely to congregate in the informal clubs of 
cafes and bars; for those who cannot afford such establishments, the central 
streets of the city, in particular the broad and tree-shaded Ramblas, offer a 
readily available meetingplace. 
Barcelona itself should provide countless opportunities for instruction 
in history. Within the city core and surrounding districts one can find two 
thousand years of often superb architecture, including Roman walls, major 
medieval religious and civic structures, and a series of neighborhoods 
reflecting the changes that the city has undergone from the high Middle Ages 
to the art nouveau ("modernisme" in Catalan) expansion of a century ago. 
Furthermore, Catalans by and large, and the citizens of Barcelona in 
particular, are not only proud of their capital, but often quite consciously 
aware of the symbolism that may accrue to cityscapes and urban architecture. 
It was with these thoughts in mind, that I awaited to see the use to 
which the city might be put as historical text. To the extent that it was 
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employed as a point of reference, two themes dominated the exposition: 
temporal continuity and Barcelona as a European city. Both themes are well 
taken. The structure of Barcelona parallels that of many other old European 
towns-- the roughly oval shape of the original core, the narrow streets of the 
old quarters, vestiges of defensive walls, the dominance of Cathedral and 
churches, and the later extramural expansion. Thus, to point out that 
Barcelona shares many features with other ancient European administrative 
and mercantile centers, is both valid and a good foundation for a more detailed 
study. 
Much the same is true respecting continuity. AE, was noted during a 
"Magna" field trip to the historic "centers of power" -- the City Hall and the 
Generalitat; the Cathedral, Episcopal Palace and associated buildings; and the 
Royal Palace -- in many respects the loci of power in Barcelona have remained 
the same for some 2,000 years. The teachers running this excursion did a 
commendable job outlining the overlapping spheres of authority in the 
medieval city. They also pointed out that, ideally at least, power in the Middle 
Ages was organized in a complementary rather than an oppositional manner. 
My notes from this successful outing close with the observation: "What one 
misses-- and granted that the physical remains work against this-- is a 
recognition that the vast majority of the inhabitants were not king, bishop, 
senyors [lords], or honored citizens." Parenthetically, it also seemed to me that 
there was a certain congruence between this emphasis on continuity and a 
non-conflictive political order on the one hand, and the values of an audience 
drawn largely from privileged backgrounds on the other. This episode would 
appear to be a particularly good example ofwhat Keene (1986:5) terms "the 
dominant story," a representation whose message is that there is "an 
unbroken line between the past and the present which supports the 
timelessness, inevitability and undeniable legitimacy of certain contemporary 
social relations." What initially struck me was the absence of even a passing 
mention of artisans, tradesmen, and workers, all vital to the operation and 
prosperity ofthe medieval city, and just those components of society most likely 
to question aspects ofthe hierarchical order. Mter some further thought, I 
realized that our tour had taken us right through the Call (from the Hebrew 
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Kahal, community), the old Jewish neighborhood between the Generalitat and 
the Cathedral. Those who at one time had lived there had gone unnoticed, nor 
was mention made of the manner of their passing. 
Obviously, a single episode hardly constitutes a pattern; after all, not all 
questions, even important and interesting ones, can be dealt with in the course 
of a morning's excursion. Nevertheless, as the the school term progressed and 
I had the opportunity to attend more classes and read the pertinent texts, a 
certain pattern seemed to unfold. I never witnessed an in-depth discussion of 
Jews in Catalonia or in other parts of Iberia, nor was there any attempt to 
compare and contrast the condition of Jewish communities in Christian Spain 
with those in other lands. Nor, for that matter, was the persecution and 
eventual expulsion of Jews from the Spanish kingdoms used to explore the 
Holocaust and other episodes of recent European history. Fundamentally, the 
fate of Spanish Jewry in late medieval and early modern times was 
approached as a regrettable example of the prejudice and fanaticism peculiar 
to the age. 
Textbook coverage of the Jews in Spain ranges from limited mention 
and the assumption that the "assimilation" of such populations was 
something of a necessity for the emergence of a more modern polity (this is the 
thrust of several EGB texts), to considerably more detailed and insightful 
presentations. In the previously mentioned Generalitat study guide, students 
are offered a vivid description of the Girona Call (the second most important in 
Catalonia) and its virtual destruction in 1391, and are invited to think of 
reasons why the Jews "were forced to live in their own neighborhoods" 
(Freixenet i Mas et al. 1986: 212, 254). Sepharad, certainly one of the more 
stimulating high school texts of those I reviewed, discusses the pogroms of 
1391, linking them to systemic economic and political crises, and goes on to 
explain that "The edict of Jewish expulsion of 1492 and the forced conversion of 
Muslims to Christianity in 1502 are the logical culmination of the policies 
introduced by the Inquisition" (Garcia el al. 1986:145,151). In general, though, 
textual coverage is thin, which can in part be accounted for by an approach 
that emphasizes formal political structures and their material manifestations. 
Whatever influence Spanish Jews enjoyed derived from an always conditional 
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royal protection and, as a stigmatized group, they were never in a position to 
develop much in the way of public art or·a distinct architectural tradition. 
Jewish culture of the period, essentially private and domestic, does not readily 
lend itself to textbook illustrations. 
The Jewish presence only marginally informs the "remembered 
history" that the present-day inhabitants of Barcelona, and Catalans in 
general, make ready reference to. Usually, when the issue comes up, Jews are 
numbered with the scores of other groups -- Greeks and Romans, Visigoths 
and Franks, Phoenicians and Saracens, French and Italians -- that conjointly 
are said to give to Catalonia its special character as a terra de pas-- a 
historical crossroads of peoples and cultures. There is certainly no denial that 
Jews had resided in Barcelona and other locations for centuries, but this is all 
seen as remote and of scant present significance.38 
There are, of course, good psychological reasons to adduce for the way 
that the subject is treated. Most obviously, there is so little to be proud of in the 
actions of the dominant society that reticence or the touching up of the 
historical record is a not unexpected reaction. 
In broad outline, what happened to the Jews in Spain is the dismally 
familiar story of a marginal group subjected to physical and symbolic violence, 
but it also constitutes a major human and communal tragedy from which 
valuable civic and historical instruction can be derived. Note might be taken 
that notwithstanding enormous pressures (present even. d~ring the most 
tolerant times), the community produced renowned thinkers and scholars (the 
closest thing to a university in medieval Barcelona was the Jewish Escola 
Major), as well as merchants and businessmen.39 Thinking about the Call 
and similar quarters can also further the analysis of some distinctly Catalan 
issues. Part of the Catalan national myth is that evils and disasters are 
essentially of external origin, a common enough reaction among subordinated 
people, and one with more than sufficient truth in the Catalan case. But what 
occurred to Catalan Jewry cannot be blamed on outside forces. The lesson that 
·should be drawn is that, historically, Catalans, in common with other peoples, 
have at times been victims, at others victimizers. Examination of the latter role 
--and how it was supported by interests and institutions-- is bound to be-
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uncomfortable, but should be explored, especially given the current climate of 
ethnic and racial tensions in Spain, a matter I shall return to in the 
conclusions. 
At a level of enquiry demanding greater sophistication, but scarcely 
beyond the intellectual capacities of pre-university students, the Jewish 
experience offers the chance to investigate models of society. In particular, the 
similarities and differences between what some have termed the "imagined 
community" of contemporary nationalism (Anderson 1983) and the 
religiously-defined collectivities of earlier times presents a fruitful approach to 
the study of identity. Much of the political debate in present-day Catalonia 
revolves around the attributes of nationality: what it means to be Catalan, how 
is membership in the nation defined and manifested-- in common parlance, 
"Who is a Catalan?" If the student is directed to a consideration of fourteenth 
century Barcelona, he will find that the most important lines of societal 
demarcation were not (granted all the difficulties of applying such 
terminology) defined by class, or even by language and culture, but by a 
concept of religious membership with some interesting parallels to nationality. 
What I am suggesting is that it is valuable for young people to understand that 
definitions of in-group and out-group are seldom unproblematic and, although 
they may seem unchanging, are in reality far from immutable; also, it needs 
to be emphasized that in all such categorizations much depends on who is 
doing the defining.40 
The value of exercises of this type is not limited to making the past more 
accessible, but can also contribute to a recognition that meaningful history, for 
all concerned, demands a balanced role for all pertinent actors. This is very 
much what Eric Wolf(1982:19) means when he writes that "The more 
ethnohistory we know, the more clearly "their" history and "our" history 
merge as part of the same history." The observation is as pertinent to the 
historical place of European minorities as it is to the non-European societies 
that he discusses. For children growing up in Catalonia, a consideration of 
these times and events is particularly apropos since a vision of a glorious and 
harmonious medieval past inspired a whole generation of early nationalist 
intellectuals. 
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The other important non-Christian population with a critical role in 
Iberian history are the Moors, or as they are generally identified in modern 
texts, the Hispano-Muslims. Treatment oflslam in Spain is conditioned by 
several factors, chief among which is the historical centrality of a 
centuries-long (711-1492) relationship between Moorish and Christian 
kingdoms and, by extension, Islam and Christendom. Phrased differently, the 
peninsula was for hundreds of years both divided and joined by a permeable 
frontier -- at times stable and peaceful, at others a zone of conflict -- between 
ideological and cultural systems. To this phenomenon of interaction and 
competition, which in some measure touched all of Europe and the Middle 
East, must be added the manifest brilliance ofmedieval Hispano-Muslim 
civilization. Given these circumstances, no Spanish text could fail to give due 
attention to such phenomena as Cordoba and its Caliphate, a state that for 
generations played a key role in European politics, and a metropolis that in 
early medieval times was by far the most important city west of 
Constantinople. 
In fact, all the texts that cover this period include separate chapters on 
Muslim Spain, often with quite detailed information on politics and economics, 
science, art and literature. Again, all the books that have come to my notice 
contain good and ample illustrations of Islamic art, pride of place being given 
to the jewels of Islamic architecture in Cordoba, Toledo, Seville, and Granada. 
There is also a general recognition that elements of Moorish culture made 
their way into later Spanish society, for example in the form of the mudejar 
architectural style. Some history books hypothesize more subtle linkages --
"The love of the Arabs for nature manifests itself in the abundance of plants 
which adorn balconies, gardens, and patios; [this] has endured in Spanish 
customs" (Centeno et al. 1977:69). Nor do the texts fail to point out that, in the 
wake ofthe reconquista, substantial numbers ofMuslims converted to 
Christianity (the moriscos), a change in religious/cultural status similar to 
that imposed on many Jews (conversos). What we have, therefore, is both a 
, recognition of an important Islamic past and an explantion of what happened 
to it: the centuries-long process known as the reconquest followed by the forced 
integration (there were several revolts) of the former Muslim population. As 
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we have noted, the way that the subject of Jewish and Muslim populations is 
treated can vary considerably from text to text, but the following analysis is 
fairly typical: 
The anti-Semitic process in a Spain in transition to a modern 
world crested (desemboc6) in 1492 in the royal decree of Jewish 
expulsion. This was the culmination of an authoritarian policy: 
the conquest of Granada and the end ofMuslim domination was 
joined to the expulsion of the Jews, which signified [the 
achievement] of religious unity in a state which could count on 
few [other] unifying links (Balanza et al. 1986:162). 
If in the treatment of such matters one can often detect ambivalence, 
the authors of texts seem considerably more comfortable -- and expansive --
when dealing with the material culture, particularly architecture, but also 
visual art in its various forms, of the non-Christian inhabitants of the 
peninsula. No doubt, at the level in question, the material world is easier to 
discuss (and illustrate) than philosophy, religious beliefs, or policies of forced 
assimilation, but it can also be argued that such an approach lends itself 
particularly well to a type of historical management which, for want ofa 
simpler term, I will call repossessing the tangible past. The transformation of 
the great mosque of Cordoba into a cathedral is the emblematic case for this 
type ofincorporation.41 But even where such symbolically-charged and 
conscious changes did not taken place, for instance in the case of palaces and 
fortifications, the sense of appropriation is similar: material vestiges of long 
ago fall into place as part of the historical landscape. 42 
The past can also be consumed in the context of specialized institutions, 
particularly museums, and it is in these that the visitor will find displayed 
artifacts ranging from Islamic ceramics to Jewish tombstones. I am not 
suggesting that this phenomenon is uniquely Spanish, but simply that it 
functions to transform the surviving past in ways that are congruent with 
present hegemonic needs. The museum segregates, displays, and what is 
particularly important for our present discussion, it distances exhibits from 
the human context in which they were originally set. The visitor (particularly 
the young student) being instructed in that which is material may well fail to 
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be much aware of that which was human. 
The observations expressed in the preceding paragraphs are based 
primarily on the examination of texts. Unfortunately, I attended only a few 
classes that touched directly on Hispano-Muslim themes, a situation that can 
largely be explained by the fact that my stay coincided with the second half of 
the school year, by which time the more advanced grades had already covered 
the Middle Ages. Granted these limitations, and taking into account the minor 
historical presence of Islam in Catalonia, I believe it is nevertheless possible to 
distinguish some significant differences in the way that the Moorish and 
Jewish contributions to Iberian history are treated. Essentially-- and at times 
quite explicitly-- the Sephardic communities are perceived as having formed 
part (to some degree at least) of the general Iberian culture. This is noticeable 
in academic texts and also in more popular publications. Thus, a very popular, 
and explicitly nationalistic, comic book rendering of Catalan history identifies 
medieval Jewish scholars resident in Barcelona as barcelonins, a term 
carrying the strongest connotations of in-group membership (Artfs-Gener 
1977:57). The book also attacks Ferdinand and Isabella, and in particular the 
former who was king of Aragon, for intolerance, the evils of the Inquisition, 
and the expulsion of the Jews from Spain (Artfs-Gener 1977:76). In contrast, 
there is very little sense, in text or discussion, that Hispano-Muslims should be 
categorized as part of the conceptual community-- even retroactively. 
I do not believe that this difference in image can simply be attributed to 
the view from Barcelona. It is worth noting that as early as 1924 Spanish 
consuls in the Balkans were instructed to facilitate passports to Sephardic 
Jews, described in the pertinent orders as 11individuals of Spanish origin11 
(Culla i Clara 1989:68). To cite another example, in the recent 1992 series of 
events and celebrations, which included the Barcelona Olympics and Expo 92 
in Seville, the city of Toledo, which in later medieval times boasted the most 
flourishing Jewish community in Spain, observed the 500th anniversary of the 
Sephardic expulsion. Perhaps predictably, plans called for the restoration of· 
' the old Jewish quarter and the dedication of a Monument to Jewish Spain 
(New York Times, April10, 1988), but notwithstanding this concern for the 
material, the message still seems to be that Jews not only resided in Spain, but 
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were in important respects "Spanish". This, as we have indicated, hardly 
meshes with how things were viewed at the time, but it fits the low-keyed 
recognition of long-ago iniquities that forms part of contemporarty 
interpretation. Nor is the issue of identity and "patriality" without significant 
current social and political consequences: Sephardic Jews, from anywhere in 
the world, can now reclaim Spanish citizenship after just two years' residency 
("What is a European?" The Economist, July 17, 1991). 
Islamic Spain, for all its recognized splendor and accomplishments, is 
seldom perceived as having formed part of core native society. Rather, one can 
reasonably interpret the designated role of the Moors in Spain as a variant of 
Said's (1978:70) generalization respecting the place of the Orient in European 
imagination: "outsiders having a special role to play inside Europe"; in short, 
quintessential "Others." That this conceptual baggage continues to influence 
the way that Spaniards -- and many other Europeans -- think and act is not to 
be doubted. There is, in fact, a high degree of congruence between popular 
perceptions and the way that scholarship is organized. Islamic studies are 
rather well developed in Spanish universities but, as elsewhere in Europe, 
these fields tend to be defined as "non-Western," essentially part of a different 
world, a distinct intellectual and artistic tradition. 
A number of Western societies, most obviously France and Britain, 
have played a critical role in the Spanish historical process. These two 
countries, who for almost two centuries were contenders with Spain for 
Western European-- and in the case ofBritain, global-- supremacy, are 
treated in the history books with a remarkable absence of negative 
stereotyping. I am not suggesting that such episodes as the defeat of the 
Armada pass without mention, or that the ceding to France of northern 
Catalonia (Treaty of the Pyrenees 1659) is not regretted, but that fundamentally 
the conflicts between Spain and its neighbors are explained in terms of the 
Realpolitik of emerging modern Europe. What all the texts stress, and what 
many class discussions elaborate, is the failure of Spain to transform i~selfinto 
a modern society.43 
The reasons cited for this failure are numerous, and they include 
foreign machinations as well as all manner of domestic problems and 
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shortcomings, but at no point did I come across a reverse of the "black legend" 
of popular English historigraphy which interprets the sixteenth century 
conflict with Spain as a moral struggle against Spanish cruelty and 
fanaticism. As the historian Fermindez-Armesto has observed (1988:vi), the 
Armada and related events "had a disproportionate part in defining English 
self-awareness." The Napoleonic invasion and the resulting long and bloody 
struggle (known in Spain as the War of Independence, 1808-1814), plays some 
role in defining the Spanish self, but more than anything else it marks a clear 
break between a state that could still legitimately claim to be an important 
power, and all the troubles and dislocations-- including the loss of empire--
that beset Spain in the next century. In short, pride in heroic resistance is 
mixed with a recognition that these events do not so much signal the 
beginning of a new era as the collapse of an old system. One could argue that 
the need to borrow models of modernization from outside its own frontiers 
(industrialization from Britain, state organization from France) helps to 
account for an absence of xenophobia in the treatment of recent European 
history. Probably equally important is the fact that Spain remained a neutral 
in the two world wars. 44 
One further category ofhistorically significant societies, the peoples of 
the Americas and other localities colonized by Spain, warrants a brief 
mention. Given that the curriculum, specifically the final year of the 
bachillerato, is supposed to integrate the history of Spain with that of other 
"Hispanic countries," a reasonably informed coverage of colonialism and its 
aftermath might be expected. This, however, is seldom the case. Texts 
generally allot limited space (usually in the wider context of the Habsburg 
world empire) to the conquest and colonization of the New World, but 
consideration of indigenous societies and what befell them is limited, most of 
the coverage being devoted to such matters as the discovery itself, European 
migration and settlement, and the establishment of colonial institutions. 
Other books (Centeno et al. 1977) contain short chapters on Hispanic America 
· and the Philippines, while the authors of one text insist that the official 
curriculum is simply impractical and explain that the volume will focus on 
the crisis of the antiguo regimen and the problems of industrialization and 
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modernization (Balanza 1986:3-4). 
It may well be true that too much is expected-- the geography and 
history of Spain and its former dependencies is a tall order -- but one can also 
argue that a discussion of the Spanish colonial experience would permit the 
linkage of the historical corpus to important contemporary issues. Even such a 
relatively recent event as the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines 
following the Spanish-American War is generally approached as one more 
indication of the inability of the Spanish political system to perform in a 
reasonably efficient and modern manner, a failure which included, to be sure, 
the insensivity of the political establishment to home rule demands in the 
colonies. Generally speaking, the colonial past is studied as a series of events, 
circumstances, and processes without much relevance to the "modern" world, 
even as a kind ofhistorical deviation. Such an approach is understandable and 
in part defensible, but it does not further consideration of some critical 
relationships between Iberian society and colonial systems, for instance the 
linkage between the late survival of a slave economy in Cuba and the 
industrialization of Catalonia. 45 
Reduced textbook and class coverage of colonial history no doubt also 
reflects a rejection of a traditional (and in particular, Francoist) historigraphy 
that emphasized Spain's "transcendental mission" as the leader of the 
Hispanic world. Also, it is not surprising that Catalan teachers spend little 
time discussing former Spanish possessions since, for politically-conscious 
Catalans, the very concept of "Empire" has long been viewed as little more 
than code for Spanish/Castilian domination. 
In conclusion, the treatment ofhistory, and within this of marginality 
in the past, stresses certain types of order and continuity and reflects a 
generally progressive-liberal interpretation ofthe dynamics ofhistory, much 
time, effort and space being devoted to the discussion of legal/constitutional 
models and documents. The dominant theme, often more implicit that explicit, 
is that after its share difficulties, Spain has finally found its proper pl~ce in the 
Western world. Still, given the degree of flux and conflict in Spanish history, it 
is remarkable how coherent -- indeed, how inevitable -- is the rendition that is 
commonly offered of this past. 
CHAPTER VII 
UNDERSTANDING THE PRESENT 
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Children growing up in Catalonia learn, by the very nature of quotidian 
experience, that two languages are commonly used in their society and that, 
roughly speaking, language use correlates with group identity or 
membership. The matter, of course, is considerably more complex. At the 
public level, politicians and intellectuals (including anthropologists) discourse 
at length on what it means to be Catalan, on the role of language and culture 
in national identity, and on whether it is legitimate to speak of 11two 
communities11 in Catalonia, or if the correct societal analysis calls for a 
common entity made up of two linguistic groups. These are matters of much 
more than rhetorical importance. They are intimately joined to issues of power 
and legitimacy, specifically the authority to make critical commentary 
respecting the political/cultural order in Catalonia and, a most important 
point, the right to help articulate policies vis-a-vis the central government. 
The details of this debate (which, by virtue of the political system, is not 
limited to those living in Catalonia) fall outside the scope of this essay 
(Pi-Sunyer 1976, 1987, 1988), but the issues are bound, at some level, to touch all 
who are growing up in society. I had therefore assumed that consideration of 
the whole matter of group identity and its ramifications would have a 
prominent place in social world and related courses; after all, the issues are 
not only intellectually stimulating, but also very much part of practical social 
reality. 
This is not what I found. Formal class discussion of nationality/identity 
is pretty well limited to expositions of the Constitution and itsrelevant articles 
on democracy, diversity, and pluralism. Nor do the texts offer much in the way 
of guidance or information: of the three third-year bachillerato books at my 
disposal, only one (Garcia et al. 1986:382-393) devotes considerable space to the 
political transition and the autonomy process.46 I found that-individuals, 
students as well as teachers, were often very reluctant-- in the context of 
school -- to talk about their identity and what this might mean in political and 
social terms. This situation, which initially struck me as puzzling, is similar 
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to the one described by Kathryn Woolard in her study on bilingualism. She 
writes that "the overt debate over who is Catalan was as rare in daily life ... as 
it was common in the media during this period. People usually did not argue 
about their identities, they performed them" (Woolard 1989:40). Her research, 
much of it carried out in five Barcelona schools, was conducted a decade ago, 
but matters have not changed all that much -- overt debate remains rare and, 
some would claim, public debate has been toned down. 
Language use in the schools is another matter. Since early in the 
political transition, the goal of the Catalan government has been to 
"normalize" the use of Catalan in the schools. The official language plan 
outlined in 1978 for secondary education (comparable ones were developed for 
other levels) defines as its first objective the control by students of "all the uses 
and registers of the Catalan language, from the most commonplace and 
familiar, to the knowledge and practice of administrative, technical, 
journalistic, scientific and literary Catalan" (Comissi6 Mixta 1978:1). Today, 
just as explicit discussion of national identity in the schools is extremely rare, 
the use of Catalan as a medium of instruction is very common. I witnessed no 
reluctance on the part of teachers to teach in Catalan and to use texts written 
in the language, even when the majority of the class might be 
Castilian-dom1nant. Other teachers employed Castilian as the language of 
instruction, but used Catalan texts. The system as it operates on the ground 
gives individual teachers a good deal ofleeway, although the political and 
linguistic aim remains faculties competent to teach in Catalan (it is correctly 
assumed that they will also be fluent in Castilian) and fully bilingual students. 
How to interpret this situation in which the presence of two languages 
is a manifest reality, but actual discussion of what this might mean in terms 
of group membership is hardly encouraged? My sense is that this reluctance is 
in large part the function of an unspoken Catalan taboo: good manners (and 
tranquil social relations) preclude the raising ofidentityissues in multi-ethnic 
contexts. People are supposed to know (through language use, accent, and 
other markers) who is a Catalan-speaker and who is a Castilian-speaker. It is 
assumed -- although certainly this is a questionable generalization -- that 
language use generally correlates with other attributes, such as political 
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orientation (statist vs; autonomist), class membership, and even, some' would 
claim, culinary preferences. Teachers in Barcelona, it seems to me, handle -
discussion of ethnicity and nationalism in a manner that has interesting 
parallels with the treatment of religion in American schools. In both 
instances, the subject is marked for special consideration not because of some 
inherent malefic quality, but because of its divisive and confrontational 
potential. The difference, of course, is that while the separation of church and 
state is recognized as a cornerstone of the American system, the post-Franco 
political agreement actually gives formal constitutional protection to cultural 
diversity and designated political rights. Another important distinction is that 
while religious affiliation (as distinct from "traditional values") no longer ·· 
represents a critical social-politicalline of cleavage in the United States, the 
longest-running insurgency in the Western world is the ETA uprising in the 
Basque Country (Clark 1984; Zulaika 1988). In short, questions of political 
rights and political legitimacy continue to impact very directly on the lives of 
ordinary people. 
The fear of violence in a population that has, in recent history, been 
exposed to a great deal of it is not something that should be treated lightly. It 
seems extreme, though, to interpret the general reluctance to discuss "ethnic" 
issues simply to fears that this might somehow abet dangerous and uncivil 
classroom behavior; important and respected public figures, after all, do not 
seem troubled by such apprehensions. Part ofthe answer, I suspect, has to do 
with context. Fundamentally, the public forum of political debate deals with 
generalities, abstractions and theories, not with how to manage the day-to-day 
world of interpersonal relations, which in our case is likely to involve the · 
person sitting next to you in the classroom. Whatever weight we may give to 
this contextual factor, in the two class sessions (both BUP-level at Sta. Eulalia) 
in which students were encouraged to discuss ethnicity and nationalism, I 
was struck by the formality and the highly theoretical bent ofthe 
presentations. 
No doubt, this formalism was in part a function of the structured 
nature of the sessions: students had volunteered, or perhaps been encouraged, 
to present "positions." But granted these constraints, it is unlikely that this 
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alone fully explains a manner and style that at times appeared more suitable 
to theological exegesis than to social analysis. It seemed to me that the 
students were following -- and had been invited to follow -- the model set by 
intellectuals, to wit, the powerful (and privileged) discourse of legal and 
constitutional analysis. Powerful when done well, but also a form that may not 
adequately address the realities of everyday life: the adjustments, the 
compromises, the very hard individual choices, indeed the contradictions, that 
one faces all the time when growing up in a place like Barcelona. 
I entered these debates towards the end by asking the presenters, a 
number of whom favored quite radical nationalist agendas, to ponder such 
tricky matters as the interplay of class, language, and national identity, and 
how they, as ordinary individuals, managed these variables; and more 
concretely, the degree to which ideological positions influenced relations with 
friends and family. All agreed in the ensuing discussion that theory and lived 
experience, while related, were not the same; and that, at some level, they had 
been aware of this distinction for a long time. Following the class, the 
instructor expressed satisfaction with these experimental sessions and 
explained to me that she had to keep the peace between different elements and 
factions in a class whose membership covered the ideological gamut from the 
children of military families to some highly radicalized youngsters. There is 
little doubt that even a rather formalistic treatment of nationalism and related 
matters represented a significant pedagogical departure. 
What we have been discussing in these last paragraphs is a common 
enough phenomenon: the problem of bridging the gap between abstract 
knowledge and concrete social experience. The secondary school students I 
worked with -- and not simply the ones in the aforementioned debate -- had 
been trained to extract meaning from formal textual materials, but not really 
to relate this universe to their own lives. No doubt this is a general educational 
problem and at least in part reflects the multiple functions of schools, 
including their role as disciplined and hierarchically ordered environments. 
In short, even debate that is defined as "open" is in reality encumbered by the 
constraints of what can best be described as several layers of self-censorship, 
much of it all the more effective because it is not fully conscious, and thus does 
61 
not demand explanation. 
If I have spent a considerable amount of space examining the really 
limited extent to which the multicultural and multilingual nature of the 
Spanish state (not to mention of Catalonia) enters the formal curriculum, it is 
because this diversity is hardly hidden. It is there, but goes unanalyzed (in the 
context of the classroom) and, at the level of interpersonal relations, is more 
acted out than stated. What this means is that really critical issues--
including the aforementioned matter ofwhat category of people have a 
legitimate right to comment on the cultural/political order-- is left not only 
unresolved, but essentially undiscussed. If this is the situation with identities 
that are commonly recognized as present, and ususually as legitimate, what 
bearing does such a finding have on the academic treatment of groups and 
minorities that lack such an established and recognized place? 
Perhaps the most evident element of common reference is one that has 
already been remarked upon, namely the wish to avoid or play down 
troublesome issues. These issues, controversial or uncomfortable, are not all of 
a kind. The cautious treatment of national identities in the schools seems to be 
related to the fear, as one teacher phrased it, that the subject "lends itself to 
polemics and bad feelings," but it also reflects -- as in other cases we will be 
examining -- the absence of an appropriate frame of analysis, even a 
"language". At an earlier point in this essay, I commented that the Gypsy 
population is never discussed in the classsroom, never makes it into the 
textbooks. Again, we have a situation where all, except perhaps the very 
youngest children, are fully aware that Gypsies exist. Furthermore, 
respondents will generally claim to be able to identify them by sight, and 
readily relate stereotyped descriptions of their life and activities. What seems to 
be especially "uncomfortable" about Gypsies is that they are felt to reflect badly 
on society as a whole. Quite apart from their reputation for shady dealin~, they 
are perceived as being the very antithesis of that which is "mod~rn" and 
"European"; in a word, theyare nothing short of a national embarrassment.47 
According to the anthropologist Calvo Buezas (1990), who recently 
undertook an extensive survey of racial and ethnic attitudes among Spanish 
students and teachers, Gypsies represent the marginal ethnic group which is 
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most likely to be perceived as dangerous or undesireable. He documents a 
general reluctance on the part of his non-Gypsy informants to engage in, or 
even hypothesize, any positive social relationship with Gypsies. At the high 
end ofthe scale ofrejection, 70 percent ofhis sample ofteachers would be 
molestados ("upset" or "disturbed") if their own children married Gypsies 
(Calvo Buezas 1990:30-31). This degree of social distancing reveals a 
deep-seated xenophobia that is seldom recognized in intellectual circles. 
Indeed, to bring up the matter of Gypsies in such contexts -- especially if one is 
a foreigner or lives abroad -- risks opening oneself to a set of fairly predictable 
responses. A not unusual observation is the claim that a concern for such 
marginal elements represents little more than thinly-veiled (and very 
misplaced) romanticism. Another common reaction is the assertion that any 
problems Gypsies may experience, are very much of their own making--
educators, for example, will generally attribute high levels of Gypsy illiteracy 
to a reluctance on the part of parents to send their children to school. 
Such explanations of Gypsy attitudes and behavior are not so much 
invalid as badly in need of contextualization. What the Gypsies have achieved 
is the very successful manipulation of a hostile social environment. In the 
process, they have managed to retain control over their own culture, resisted 
the state and its authority, and avoided proletarianization. As Kaprow 
(1982:400; see also Gmelch 1986:322-323) has expressed it, "neither Gypsies, 
Basques, nor Catalans disappeared as a result of centuries of exclusion by the 
dominant society," but this lesson is not being taught in the schools of 
Barcelona nor, I am convinced, anywhere else in Spain. The Gypsies, I would 
argue, are not stigmatized because of their resistance to state authority -- there 
is a long and honorable contestatorial tradition in Spain -- but chiefly because 
they are viewed as rejecting a constellation of beliefs and practices that 
structure social life and the management of group relations in the dominant 
social order. Particularly significant for our analysis is the fact that common 
opinion holds that they have no place for education, either as a desideratum in 
its own right or as the premier mechanism for achieving social mobility; in 
much the same way, they are seen as refusing to participate in the political 
process. 
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This perceived, and to some degree real, separation from the workings 
of civil society goes together with a series of other traits that tend to reinforce 
alterity, among which is an ethnic division oflabor that marks certain 
occupations-- fortune-telling, entertaining, scavenging, and sundry itinerant 
professions -- as either Gypsy preserves or callings in which Gypsies play an 
important role. In reality, contemporary Spanish Gypsies are much more 
sedentary than is generally assumed and, in common with the rest of the 
population, they are increasingly to be found in the cities. By the same token, 
many of the traditional pursuits, especially those associated with horse 
trading, have virtually disappeared. 
But what matters, I think, is that as a class or category Gypsies are 
regarded as conceptually outside society, linked to occupations that areoften 
despised, and viewed as nomadic or transient (another form of marginality): 
Freeman (1979: 224-30) enumerates several non-Gypsy groups that, much like 
the Gypsies, have been labeled as pueblos malditos -- damned or despised 
peoples. A substantial number of these lived in geographically marginal 
environments and were involved in occupations, such as herding and animal 
breeding, carting, and muleteering, that overlap some of the traditional Gypsy 
trades. Again, like the Gypsies, they resided in segregated districts or 
neighborhoods and enjoyed few rights. I find it instructive that in most cases 
these groups did not define themselves as different from the larger society, but 
rather that their difference and low status were conferred upon them. 
What I am suggesting is that there exists a very general model of ·· · 
marginality that, in years past, seems to have been applied to a variety of 
groups and entities. Elements of this model, I believe, continue to have 
contemporary salience. It is hardly irrelevant that the most numerous of 
non-Iberian marginals, the Arabs, are popularly regarded as being both 
itinerant and engaged in low status occupations. Essentially the same 
assumption is often made respecting blacks. 
In brief, we have a situation in Catalonia where the most critical line of 
' cultural (and often political) cleavage, that between Catalan-speakers and 
Castilian-speakers, is seldom discussed in the schools, other than in the.most 
formal constitutional terms. People, including students, do manifest group · 
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affinity, but primarily through language use and friendship ties. There seems 
to be an unspoken agreement that the key issues of culture and power will 
either not be raised in the classroom or at least will be treated with 
consummate care when they are. Falling outside this schema are Gypsies and 
sundry rural enclaves, mostly historical, that have been perceived as not really 
forming part of the body social or the body politic. 
Generally speaking -- and for good and sufficient reasons -- Gypsies 
have seldom tried to use higher order institutions for the redress of grievances, 
a circumstance likely to reinforce the impression that they are outside the 
social orbit by conscious choice. They may also be viewed as peripheral by 
reason oftime and distance. Calvo Buezas (1989:83) observes that not only are 
several of the few references to Gypsies in his extensive sample of school texts 
related to the historical past, but that in two text passages the reference is to 
Gypsies outside of Spain (one in Colombia, the other in Nazi Germany). There 
is validity in his observation that "it is easier to speak of the discrimination of 
yesterday than of today" (Clavo Buezas 1989:80); and, one might add, perhaps 
easier to position it abroad rather than at home. 
The conceptual universe that most schoolchildren utilize to make sense 
of their social world is, as previously noted, quite sophisticated in some ways, 
limited in others. More than one of my young informants insisted that Gypsies 
fell outside the structure of class society-- "they are not peasants or workers, 
and obviously they don't belong to the wealthy classes" -- but not due to the 
circumstance that they had successfully resisted the state and capitalism, but 
rather because they "refuse to work," an apparent moral shortcoming (but, no 
doubt, also an enviable state). 
"Work," I found, is one of those concepts or measures that are 
commonly used in reference to designated outsiders-- often in contradictory 
ways. Thus, foreigners may be perceived as "taking work away" from 
Spaniards (reference may be made to the high rate of unemployment that the 
country is experiencing), but it is also not unusual to be told that many aliens 
either do not engage in real work or that they make their living in illegal ways, 
especially as drug traffickers. Even children in elementary grades, I found, 
are likely to associate the growing drug problem and related violence with 
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foreigners. They are, of course, unlikely to understand with much clearly the 
link between illegal (or criminal) activity and the absence of work permits and 
other mandatory documentation. 48 Further discussion of these issues may 
well reveal that the archetypical dangerous foreigner is conceptualized either 
as a Latin American (media coverage plus the substantial Latin American 
presence in Barcelona?) or an African. Reasonably well-to-do and 
"respectable" foreigners-- rich retirees, middle class tourists, investors, the 
people who work for multinationals, and, let me add, visiting scholars--
clearly belong to a different category; nobody, for example, ever ventured the 
opinion that Swiss (or for that matter, Japanese) managers might make 
inroads into the available pool ofwhite-collar jobs. 
What I am suggesting is that "undesirable" or "dangerous" categories 
of people are very likely to be perceived as marginal to society, members of 
some underclass, engaged in criminal activities, actual or potential 
competitors in a tight job market, and increasingly ofnon-European origin--
especially when alienness happens to correlate with low socioeconomic status. 
Needless to say, not all of these attributes need be present in the same 
individual. The general model fits internal marginals (especially the Gypsies 
as a long-established pariah group) as well as the majority of more recent 
non-European immigrants. 
Contact between local schoolchildren and non-Iberian individuals, 
whether adults or age-mates, is, I found, not too common other than in 
structured and out-of-the-ordinary contexts, such as vacation trips or school 
excursions. It is true that virtually everyone has met some tourists --jokes 
featuring culturally disoriented tourists abound -- but again the forms of 
interaction tend to be stylized. As one might expect, there is some stereotyping, 
but basically the attitudes held respecting other European nationalities are 
positive, often highly so; older and more sophisticated students are not at all 
reluctant to view themselves as part of a larger European community. My 
subjective impression is that children are fundamentally reflecting current 
·ideas on the many advantages that are generally believed to accrue to a Spain 
with close links to its European neighbors. 
The degree of contact between my respondents and people of 
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non-European origin, including those resident in Spain, is even more 
restricted. Part of the reason for this difference is simply a question of 
numbers: with 50 million tourists, mostly from Western Europe, entering 
Spain annually, it is impossible not to be aware of them, to have some degree of 
personal encounter with this kind of visitor. In contrast, poor non-Europeans 
are far fewer in number. There are perhaps 700,000 "economic immigrants" 
(not all of them Third World) in Spain, some 190,000 ofwhom are Arabs, and of 
these 25,000 reside in Catalonia (El Pais,_February 17, 1987; Cambio 16, 
February 9, 1987; Diari de Barcelona, May 30, 1987). What may be equally 
important in perceptual terms is the circumstance that many non-Europeans 
are likely to be working (as distinct from vacationing), moving through the 
country as rapidly as possible (using Spain as a bridge between France and 
Morocco), or living in the poorest neighborhoods. Estimates of how many of 
these immigrants lack the necessary legal documentation range from a low of 
72,000 to a high of 300,000 (El Pais [international edition], May 28, 1990; El Pais 
[international edition], March 25, 1991; El Pais, July 8, 1991). Numbers apart --
and non-Europeans are certainly visible in some districts of Barcelona-- the 
constraints and limitations noted above work to limit the possibilities of easy 
interaction between the average Barcelona student and this type of foreign 
resident. 
I am not suggesting that poverty and marginality are as distant from 
the lived experience of the schoolchildren I worked with as the problems of the 
inner city are, apparently, to many contemporary suburban youths in the 
United States. The residential pattern of Barcelona is more compact than that 
of a comparable American metropolis and, furthermore, several of my 
informants were of working class background or came from families of poor 
peasant origin. What is striking, though, is the extent to which racial 
minorities, as distinct from poor people in general, are externalized in social 
and cultural terms. Some of this comes through directly in the language of 
categorization: "them" (the entity under discussion) in counterposition to "us" 
(Catalans or Spaniards). Thus, students told me on several occasions that they 
personally had nothing against Arabs, but that, of course, "they" would have to 
become more like "us" if they expected to live harmoniously in Spain. Probing 
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the matter further, I received a variety of explanations ranging from the 
general .. they have very different customs .. to specific observations on hygiene 
and the treatment ofwomen in Islamic societies. Very little of this 
commentary was based on first hand experience, and most of it was obviously 
drawn from the common fund of ethnic and racial stereotypes. 
One of the interesting features of this position is that the desired shifts 
in styles of life (however we may assess an assimilationist perspective) are in 
reality very difficult to achieve for the individuals being urged to make them. 
Leaving aside the special situation of illegal aliens, many who have the 
requisite papers, blacks and Arabs especially, are forced to live an existence 
severely constrained by what French sociologists term 11soft11 apartheid: a 
system of unofficial residential and workplace segregation. One might also 
add that apart from some wealthy Arab visitors (mostly members of the 
Moroccan elite and sojourners from the Persian Gulf), Arabs and Mricans are 
nearly all poor, often exceedingly so. What this entails in structural terms is 
populations composed chiefly of people working at menial tasks; that is, 
collectivities with very reduced middle class components. Inongo-vi-Makome 
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(1990), who has written the first major testimony of the Mrican diaspora in 
Spain, takes special note of the ubiquity of unconscious racism in Spain and, 
very much a related matter, of how difficult it is for blacks to occupy other than 
subordinate positions. He is no doubt correct that many Spaniards are simply 
unable to imagine blacks -- and particularly black women -- filling roles of 
prestige and authority in Iberian society. It is certainly true that the new 
immigrant populations as a whole (with the exception of Latin Americans), 
can count on very few gatekeeper individuals, people not only skilled in the 
ways ofthe dominant society, but also enjoying a measure of prestige and 
position in it. This situation is bound to reinforce segregation and mute the 
immigrant voice.49 
Perhaps because there is, indeed, so little direct contact with such 
groups and populations, children project on them all manner of qualities and 
attributes. This became very evident during carnival celebrations at 'Valle 
Inclan. 11 Sufficient to note here that even in the ambit of a school-organized 
festivity, carnival retains its characteristic as a ritual of reversal and an 
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opportunity for sanctioned license. To be more specific, the kids took over the 
school, carried out their plans (a day devoted to loud popular music, a "feast," 
many practical jokes, the subtle and not-so-subtle mocking of authority, and 
the production of various skits) while the adults-- who, of course, understood 
their roles perfectly well -- were expected to take all these doings in good grace 
and act the parts assigned to them. 
This day ofhighjinks and moderated misrule was simply one variant 
of the many forms of carnival found throughout the Latin world (see Caro 
Baroja 1965; Gilmore 1975; Brandes 1988). What is significant for our 
immediate purpose is that each class of children planned how they, as a 
group, would attire themselves and act, and that many of these personae can 
be said to represent "Others." A word of caution is in order at this point. It 
would be inappropriate to apply culturally-specific American notions of social 
propriety or ethnic sensitivity to these events and to the fantasies that they 
encapsulate. 
One class of eleven- and twelve-year olds, boys as well as girls, dressed 
themselves up as fortune-tellers/Gypsies, which by the nature of the role 
entailed that the boys had to wear skirts as well as bras amply stuffed with 
cotton. Hilariously funny in context, particularly when the boys came in for a 
tremendous amount of ribbing from the girls. Another group, somewhat 
younger, attired themselves as "savages," which meant not only black tights 
and black-face for everybody, but also a wicked assortment of mock weapons . 
. What is one to make of such productions? The "savage" girls who 
surrounded me -- stereotyped grass skirts, bones through frizzy hair, shields 
ornamented with "fierce" designs, and spears at the ready -- and told me that I 
was next for the pot (after their teacher!) were acting out a light-hearted ritual 
of reversal and portraying not real people but a fantasy of power. But, 
obviously, at some level, they were also tapping into a series of very old ideas 
and beliefs that linked blackness with geographical and cultural distance 
(thus appropriate for this scenario), ferocity, perhaps even anarchy. In short, 
they could utilize a series of culturally coded messages that did not require 
further explication. 
When, some days later, I discussed the matter of these exotic portrayals 
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with a small group of older students at another school, I was told that 
"savages" and "cannibals" were standard figures in childish masquerade, 
that the components of the costume could be easily purchased in toy stores and 
other shops, and that these figures were not meant to represent anything more 
than make-believe "wild" people, "such as in adventure stories of jungles and 
desert islands." Clearly, it was all meant to be taken as innocent merriment. 
For my part, I am sure that the children (and the adults) never thought that 
such portrayals might cause anyone distress or injury. Granted these good 
intentions, it can hardly be doubted that people of color, and black Mricans 
especially, are likely-- even in Spain-- to see matters in a different light. What 
needs to be addressed is why this possibility was apparently not entertained. 
I believe that part of the answer has to be sought in the repertoire of 
common themes and images. Television and print advertising, for example, 
not only restricts itself to the use of models that are phenotypically European, 
but within this range heavily favors the tall, the blond, and the fair skinned. I 
would say that this is an old theme in new guise, but one that has been 
reinforced by the economic power of northern countries and their role in mass 
consumption. In contraposition to this association of whiteness with the good 
things of life, is the circumstance that many tropical products sold in Spain 
(coffee, cocoa, rum, etc.) continue to carry labels with what we may term 
"colonial" connotations. One brand of chocolate products, for example, sports a 
label depicting a file of loin-clothed black porters, loads balanced on their 
heads, making their way through the tropical forest. Among the messages 
being projected, is that of a distant continent inhabited by distant people; in 
short, a context that is exotically separated from everyday life in Spain. 
Perhaps the most egregious representation of the exotic other is 
provided by "Conguitos," a popular brand of chocolate covered peanuts. The 
logotype for this candy is a naked infantile black figure ("-ito" is a diminutizing 
suffix joined to "Congo") with stereotyped black physical characteristics and 
wielding --very much like the schoolchildren at the carnival -- the regulation 
· spear. The company also gives away "Conguito" dolls as premiums.50 Russell 
(1991), who has studied the image of the black other in contemporary Japanese 
mass culture, argues that in Japan such representations are linked both to 
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Western graphic conventions, some ofwhich "may have passed out of usage in 
the West itself' (Russell1991:21), and to questions of identity and racial 
hierarchy. In a manner not unlike Japan, Spain has been influenced by 
American films and other vehicles depicting blackness and primitiveness. 
Also-- again there are some interesting parallels with Japan-- in. part because 
of geographical location (the European periphery), in part because of an earlier 
history of relative poverty and economic dependency, Iberian societies have 
had to confront and manage a whole set of contradictions respecting their own 
status vis-a-vis an idealized West. The French, after all, long claimed that 
"Africa begins at the Pyrenees." 
Distancing phenomena such as Sambo imagery, or the association of 
Arabs and Gypsies with a world that is· exotic and remote, function to 
reproduce social stratification and reinforce the hierarchical positioning of 
subordinate groups (Reed-Danahay and Anderson-Levitt 1991:557). What we 
have, fundamentally, is a situation where, as Williams (1989:430) has noted, 
"the metaphors and prototypes that express our understandings of person and 
group in the identity formation process of nation building" are linked to 
stereotypes of cultural and biological identities; some individuals or groups are 
perceived to fit the the appropriate national category (or categories), others do 
not. One way of handling this lack of fit is to exclude from the conceptual 
mainstream elements defined as culturally unsuitable or even as racially 
dangerous. 
It is a process that can be seen to operate at many levels ranging from 
advertising to children's carnival activities, and from the concerns of 
intellectuals to the offerings of prime-time television. An excellent example of 
the latter, in fact, was recently provided by a highly popular television 
program, La vida en un xip ("Life in a [micro]chip"), which follows the 
fortunes and vicissitudes of a fictional "ordinary" family (they own a cafe) and 
uses the weekly episode, usually elaborated around a problem or a dilemma, to 
introduce an important ethical or social issue. Following the episode, the 
matter is first addressed by a panel of "experts" and/or specially interested 
parties, and then opened up to debate and commentary by the studio audience. 
The show of particular significance for our discussion addressed issues 
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of racism and prejudice in contemporary Spain/Catalonia, and was advertised 
as such. 51 Among the studio audience was a substantial representation of 
North Mricans and several blacks. The high point of the evening came when a 
young black woman responded to a particularly bigoted youth by noting that 
she was not the "problem" (much of the debate had been structured around the 
concept of the "immigrant problem"), but that he most certainly was. From 
this she went on to develop a more general critique, essentially making the 
point that Spanish society needed to reexamine itself and not be deluded into 
assuming that its social problems were of external derivation. Her comments 
carried particular weight since they were spoken in Catalan, which implicitly 
defined her as a legitimate member of the national collectivity; in short, one 
with the right to speak as an insider. 
The privileged nature ofher observations was not lost on the audience 
which was forced to confront the conundrum posed by a conceptual outsider 
using the symbolically-powerful in-group language to present the case for a 
change in in-group attitudes and perceptions. She was listened to with rapt 
attention (almost awe) and received an enthusiastic ovation when she ended 
her commentary. Her remarks generated considerable debate, including the 
observation that it was "remarkable" that this young black woman spoke 
Catalan so well while many "immigrants" from southern Spain continued to 
speak only Castilian after decades of living in Catalonia. This line of argument 
promised to open up the "who is a Catalan" debate, the dangerous forbidden 
ground examined earlier in this section. Not surprisingly, the moderator cut 
off a discussion ("not relevant," "too political") that would explicitly compare 
the phenomenon of internal migration (mostly from southern Spain) with the 
more recent experience of extra-European migration (mostly from Mrica), 
Even with these limitations, it was clear that for many people (and this 
was remarked on by several members of the studio audience),' the program 
offered a rare opportunity to begin to think about their society in other than 
conventional terms. At the same time, however, there was considerable 
· resistance to the unpalatable notion that racism was present and flourishing 
in the the Spanish state; in truth, some who protested strongly that they, their 
friends, or the nation, were not prejudiced did so in language that revealed not 
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only the inadequacy of conceptual frames, but also deep-seated fears and 
unresolved contradictory emotions. 52 
This unique program, one that surely would have been useful in 
stimulating classroom and individual discussion, was aired after the period of 
fieldwork, but the underlying attitudes and perceptions (particularly those of 
ambivalence) manifested by a substantial number of its participants are fully 
consistent with what I often encountered among my young respondents. As 
previously noted, the press, including 11serious11 publications, frequently 
reinforces an image of the non-European, especially the Mrican,as being both 
dangerous and properly belonging to another conceptual universe. 53 Much the 
same process of externalization of non-European populations was evident in 
the media coverage ofwhat came to be known as 11the affair of the veil11 --the 
polemic that convulsed the French educational establishment on the matter of 
whether Muslim (which in virtually all instances meant Maghrebi) girls 
should be allowed to wear head-scarves within the precincts of French secular 
schools. What is interesting about this question is the degree of attention it 
received in the Spanish media and how the demands/requests of a handful of 
families were often portrayed as posing a threat to the rule ofreason (as 
distinct from 11obscurantism11), the advances of feminism, the structure of 
secular education, and even the foundations of republicanism and democracy. 
Granted that the issue is a complex one that involves several conflicting 
notions of right and legitimacy, the matter of proportion is certainly pertinent. 
Were these schoolgirls really the advance guard of Islamic fundamentalism? 
Did they have the potential of so distorting and contaminating the wellsprings 
of Western education that it was necessary to bar them from the classroom? 
Was the correct response of teachers to threaten -- and in some cases to 
undertake -- strike actions? The answers to these and other questions are 
probably much less important than the fact that the drama and all its subplots 
were closely followed in Spain; certainly, both text (religious/cultural 
observance) and context (the schools and their socializing role) reinforced the 
sense of threat from the little-known, and even less understood, world of 
Islam. 54 
Students of Iberian culture might respond at this juncture that there 
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are also sundry popular images of "blackness" or "darkness" that are 
anything but negative. The Virgin of Montserrat, most powerful and most 
esteemed of the Catalan supernatural patrons, is, after all, a black Virgin ("la 
moreneta"); the most popular of the Magi in the Epiphany celebrations is the 
one traditionally depicted as a black king; and, in somewhat the same domain 
of the magical, there are numerous "black" and/or "Moorish" gegants, the 
"giants" (generally portrayed as imposing regal couples) that symbolically 
represent particular towns, cities, or parishes in Catalan civic rituals. 55 All of 
which is true, but these are images safely distanced from everyday life. Equally 
far is an extensive repertoire of popular theatre and traditional song, 
including the Catalan sailors' songs known as havaneras (from Havana), that 
often romanticize the remote and exotic. In summary, images of this type tend 
to project a particular type of alterity: magical and supernatural, distant and 
exotic and, perhaps most important of all, safely "domesticated." 
The formal structures of instruction do little to challenge the received 
ideas I have been discussing in this section. My own impression is that the 
major problem lies less in the absence of a multicultural curriculum, as the 
term is commonly understood in the United States (although a broadening of 
the boundaries of knowledge certainly would be helpful), than in a failure to 
address the reality and social costs of marginality, especially immigrant 
marginality, in contemporary Iberian society. The best texts and study guides 
do take note of the fact that the world we live in is characterized by diversity 
and conflictivity, but most of the cases used to illustrate this position seem to be 
external, such as the fate of Turkish workers in Germany, the presence of 
apartheid in South Africa, and life in the favela slums of Rio de Janeiro and 
other Brazilian cities (Freixenet i Mas et al. 1986: 9, 14-16). The curricular 
materials and course guides produced by the Departament d'Ensenyament of 
the Generalitat stress the momentous social and economic changes -- often 
painful-- that the country has experienced since 1945, but without reference 
that I could detect to migration from other countries. The professional social 
'science literature, including anthropology, has also paid but limited attention 
to marginal or minority populations in Spain or to recent shifts in 
immigration (see Giner 1990 and Cuc6 and Pujadas 1989).56 
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Given this apparent lack of concern for the changing composition of 
Spanish society (all the more remarkable if we keep in mind the process of 
Western European integration), it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
schools in Barcelona are faithfully reflecting a general process that entails a 
good deal of distancing and denial. What is absent is not only a reasoned and 
sympathetic account of the culture of some of Spain's nearest North African 
neighbors-- a task that might be initiated with a limited expenditure of 
resources-- but a perspective on Spanish society, contemporary and historical, 
which gives voice to cultures and collectivities that today find scant refuge in 
the texts and little attention in classroom discussion. In the next and 
concluding chapter I examine some of the factors that would appear to have 
contributed to this situation, in particular what might be called the unstated 
limits on discourse and knowledge. 
CHAPTER VIII 
HEGEMONY AND CULTURAL PROCESS 
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The Gramscian paradigm fundamentally addresses the relationship 
between political and economic power on the one hand, and a continuum of 
group and individual responses to such power on the other. These responses 
include resistance and opposition, but more commonly entail gradations of 
acquiescence from passive consent to absolute commitment. In many respects, 
the issues that Gramsci treats fall squarely into the cultural domain, for 
instance his concern with language and its uses, and more specifically, the 
recognition that "every language contains the elements of a conception of the 
world" (Femia 1987:44). It is from this position that he is able to examine the 
hegemonic function of language and the degree to which the acceptance of 
cultural assumptions fixes the terms of discourse and impedes the expression 
of heretical ideas. 
In contrast, what we may term mainstream Marxist interpretations 
(which certainly come in a variety of forms) are given to economic and 
materialist primacy, the assu~ption being that the task of the interprete~ or 
analyst is to strip away the fat;ade of culture to reach the underlying economic 
foundations of power. Taken to its logical conclusions, such an approach 
empties culture of any explanatory value: culture is perceived as 
epiphenomenal, a manifestation of false consciousness. Indeed, very often, 
materialist interpretations are much more concerned with the boundaries of 
(and between) cultural systems than with the content or meaning of cultural 
domains. The Gramscian perspective is not only much more explicitly 
political, but actually reverses the standard base-superstructure relationship 
by insisting that systems of power are embedded in underlying ctiltural orders, 
the task of the analyst being to understand how these hegemonic systems are 
constructed, controlled, manipulated and transmitted by those groups and 
classes who exercise political and economic dominance. 
The utility of the Gramscian approach, I would argue, goes 
considerably further than the value it assigns to cultural domains and 
ideological formations. It is also a very sophisticated model of particular 
76 
relevance for those engaged in the interpretation of modern societies; that is to 
say, societies characterized by cleavages and contradictions, often with 
extreme internal antagonisms, and in many instances enjoying a far from 
secure sense of corporate unity. In societies of this type, the hegemonic process 
does not resolve the underlying structural problems, but rather, it functions to 
make the crisis much less manifest. 
An approach informed by hegemony also has the virtue that it focusses 
attention on the relational and social character of systems of power in a clearer 
and more direct manner than do such concepts as dominant culture or 
ideological reproduction. As Kinsman (1991:105) has phrased it, "it suggests 
how social regulation is actively accomplished by individuals in diverse 
institutional sites and is something that is always 'problematic'." 
One critically important hegemonic mechanism is intellectual, 
specifically the power of state and capital (through institutional pressures and 
other inducements) to influence and manage intellectual agendas. Even if 
there is no direct state control over intellectual activity, the elite is in a very 
strong position when it comes to what Gramsci terms "the battle of ideas." To 
the degree that intellectuals consciously or unconsciously reflect and project 
the world-view of the ruling class, this will work to delegitimize not only overt 
opposition, but also what we may call alternative cultural/social readings. The 
relevance of these insights for an understanding of educational systems 
(especially highly centralized and bureaucratized ones) should be evident. 
Gramsci's major focus was the capitalist society of his time, but we .. 
should remember that his ideas were developed in a particular historical 
context -- an Italy which had achieved political unification not much more 
than half a century earlier, a land with extreme class and regional 
inequalities, a society which was still attempting to respond to all the stresses 
of recent industrialization. For many in Italy -- some fearing and others 
hoping -- the potential for social disintegration seemed ever-present. Given 
these circumstances, it is not so surprising that the Italian economic and 
political directorate, including the monarchy, rather willingly acquiesced to 
the fascist takeover (Mack Smith 1989; Stille 1991). Fascism, of course, 
promised a number of supposedly valuable benefits. For the state, it offered an 
77 
image of modernization and, so it was claimed, a rightful place at the table of 
the great powers; internally, the myth was that of a social and political order 
free of discord. 
Gramsci, coming of political age in this environment, and very much a 
product ofthe tensions found in Italian society, at times seemed to be the 
advocate ofpersonalliberty, at others favoring "totalitarian" solutions which, 
in the last analysis, were bound to lead to absolutist control by the party-state--
in short, a hegemonic structure erected and controlled by a Communist 
political elite. 57 However we interpret the extensive-- and certainly not always 
internally consistent -- Gramscian corpus, one feature comes through very 
clearly: the ubiquity of power relations and the extent to which these relations 
are mediated, maintained and perpetuated by systems of knowledge that 
faithfully reflect elite domination. 
If I have gone some lengths to outline the Gramscian paradigm, it is 
because I feel it offers valuable insights on political and social processes in 
Spain. Spain and Italy share a number of significant historical and structural 
characteristics. Perhaps most obviously, they formed part (and in some 
measure still do) of Europe's southern periphery-- countries of relatively late 
industrialization and attendant social dislocations and transformations. Not 
unrelated to this economic marginality has been the previously noted 
propensity for economic and social elites to espouse, or at least not oppose, 
various forms of dictatorial and quasi-dictatorial rule (a situation with obvious 
parallels in Portugal and Greece). Possibly less evident to outside observers is 
the circumstance that in both Spain and Italy the burden of history takes the 
form a particularly onerous -- and often destabilizing -- combination of past 
glories and past catastrophes. I would add one other common ingredient: the 
tendency for intellectuals to search for all-encompassing, even absolutist, 
solutions to social and political problems. For many generations the root 
political paradigm in Spain was more often than not derived from the French 
experience, and especially from that process of state reconstruction that 
· attended the French Revolution. France, it was hoped, could provide models of 
and models for modernity applicable to a broad spectrum of issues ranging 
from the rational organization of the state bureaucracy to the elaboration of a 
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contemporary sense of nationhood. The essential point is that while the 
emancipatory legacy of the Revolution is not in question, as a cultural and 
intellectual movement it tended to be intolerant of diversity and dissent. 
Equally important for our purposes, this radical experiment in applied social 
change provided the original case example ofmodern, as distinct from 
patrimonial, state absolutism. 58 
What I am suggesting is that historically the political and social 
theories of greatest currency in Spain (and in Italy) have stressed a dirigiste 
role for the state; emphasized the centrality of a guiding, politically inspired, 
elite; and tended to foster a conflation of state culture and national culture. In 
these constructs, the underlying assumption is that the state can and should 
be in the business of cultural formation (especially through the educational 
system) and that the "culture" in question should satisfy some fixed criteria of 
orthodoxy or uniformity. At this juncture, readers might reasonably respond 
· that all state systems and associated intellectual establishments are engaged 
in essentially in the same task. Perfectly true, but the state apparatus may be 
more or less intrusive and the cultural politics be more or less hegemonic. For 
reasons we shall discuss below, in Spain the desire of the state directorate to 
control has seldom been matched by its capacity to put into practice the 
necessary policies. 
I would argue that this directorate has pretty consistently regarded 
evidence of cultural pluralism as much more of a danger than as a challenge 
or opportunity. Such an attitude is already very evident in early modern times, 
especially as the Habsburg system of empire and absolutism come under 
increasing pressure. The political fragility and economic backwardness of 
Spain for much of the last two centuries helped to entrench these fears; for 
their part, the models of state and society discussed above gave legitimacy to a 
view of the political and cultural order offering, at best, a reduced conceptual 
space to minority cultures and competing visions of the nature and place of the 
state. 
This stress on hegemony-- various manifestations of orthodoxy, 
centralization, and control -- should not hide from us the reality of a much 
greater degree of internal diversity and dissent, often of outright resistance to 
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established authority, than may be apparent from a superficial consideration 
of the Spanish past (Sahlins 1989). It is not unreasonable, in fact, to argue that 
historically the hegemonic process has often taken on the characteristics of an 
elite response to sundry counter-hegemonic tendencies and forces. As a 
particularly well documented case, one can cite the early seventeenth century 
sense of crisis and beleaguerment, what Elliott (1963: 294) describes as "not 
only a time of crisis, but a time also of the awareness of crisis -- of a bitter 
realization that things had gone wrong."59 This perception of a deep societal 
disorder brought to the fore all manner of reformers (arbitristas) who set 
themselves the task of analyzing the ills of society and advancing plans and 
projects designed to cure the "sickness"; generally, the proposed prescriptions 
called for a stronger dose of authoritarianism. From that time onwards, we 
can follow a national debate about "decline," some analysts insisting that what 
the country needed was sufficient "willpower," "discipline" and "vision," 
others claiming that the only salvation lay in modernization and 
"Europeanization."60 
It is particularly vital to have at least some sense of the contested 
nature ofhegemony in Spain since the tradition of British popular historical 
interpretation, which most English-speaking peoples have inherited, paints an 
altogether different picture of uniformity and fanaticism.61 In reality, there 
has at most times been a goodly distance between the sweeping authority of the 
state and its abilities to apply all the intimidating powers that it may enjoy on 
paper. The reasons for this disparity are various and include a history of 
competing jurisdictions and competing loyalties, and perhaps something 
equally important -- the strong disinclination of Spaniards to relinquish their 
personal and corporate autonomy, shall we say their right to make judgments 
and act accordingly, to the state and its agents; in Gramscianjargon, they are 
people little prone to "state worship" (Femia 1981:172, 176). 
Numerous observers of the Spanish scene have remarked on this 
characteristic and how it manifests itself in different ways. At times there may 
' be a quite explicit recognition of the limits of power but, as in the well-known 
Spanish saying, "the law is obeyed but not fulfilled", the myth of authority is 
not directly challenged; in other circumstances, stresses and contradictions 
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exacerbate those "cracks in the collective texture of the country" which de 
Madariaga (1943:26) and many others since his time have drawn attention to, 
and the result is confrontation, even conflict. 62 Spain, we would do well to 
remember, has been the only European country in which anarchism-- an 
ideology which equally rejects the power of capital, the structures of state 
control, and the authority ofhierarchical religion-- ever achieved the status of 
a mass political and social movement. Expressing the matter differently, what 
we must be attentive to in any discussion of the workings ofhegemony in Spain 
are the enormous pressures that often lurk under the surface, and how these 
have led to periodic anti-authoritarian outbreaks and mobilizations. 
Does this circumstance have a bearing on the way that the "absent 
others" of the title, and the complex issues they raise, are dealt with in and out 
of school? In theory it should, since in the last analysis what we are discussing 
is the degree to which opinions, ideas, and perspectives that question the 
comfort of established verities receive something more than pro forma 
attention. Unfortunately, and granted the strong contestatorial tradition 
outlined above, there are numerous devices that restrict discussion of such 
matters and topics, especially in the classroom. We have examined some of 
these mechanisms in detail and there is no need to go over the same ground 
once more, but fundamentally, they all function to offer an image of society --
past and present-- in which conflict and contradiction, greed and power, 
bigotry and hate, play remarkably little part. As noted earlier, to the degree 
that such issues are considered, they are more often than not seen as 
particularly applicable to other societies or to a time long removed from the 
present. 
Intellectually, such an approach is bound to impoverish the 
curriculum in ways both direct and indirect. A couple of instances can serve 
as illustration. One can readily understand, for instance, why Spaniards today 
(particularly in their new-found role as modern "Europeans"), ponder but little 
about their imperial past. In truth, from the time of the first wars of 
independence in the Americas, through the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines in 1898, to the final evacuation of Spanish forces from the Sahara 
in 1975, the general thrust of colonial history has been a disastrously 
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unsuccessful attempt to hold onto territory in the interests of what is generally 
termed "national honor." All rather depressing, but to write off five centuries 
of colonialism is not only too simple, it also assures the loss of valuable lessons 
and insights. This is very much at the core of Octavio•s Paz•s complaint 
(interview in El Pais, April 1, 1990) that "Spain ignores [Latin] America" and 
his further observation that it is "very curious that there does not exist a single 
modern important Spanish essay on Mesoamerica." The point is well-taken, 
and certainly neither ancient Mesoamerica nor the colonial period receive 
more than perfunctory coverage in the schools. Is this absence of interest 
important? I would suggest that the loss is, in fact, substantial for several 
reasons, and not the least because the issues of justice and equality so central 
in today's Latin American discourse were first articulated in the sixteenth 
century by such powerful Spanish humanists as Bartolome de las Casas and 
Francisco de Vitoria. Indeed, the title of las Casas• masterpiece, The 
Destruction ofthe Indies (1552), has all too contemporary a ring. 
If Latin America receives limited attention, discussion of Morocco, 
Spain•s last significant colonial holding, is even more sketchy. Again, without 
getting into too much detail, it is important to point out some of the special 
dimensions of the case. The decolonization of Morocco is quite recent (1956), but 
more than this, Morocco played a vital (if unwitting) role in the attempt of the 
Spanish oligarchy, in this century and the last, to claim for Spain the status of 
a significant European power. The military, political, and rhetorical work of 
colonial domination followed the usual pattern (Driessen 1987; for a 
comparison with French Algeria see Alloula 1986), but with the distinction 
that colonial affairs intruded very directly into Spanish life. It was in Morocco 
that the professional military nurtured a disdain for everything "political," 
and it was from Morocco that the military uprising that initiated the Civil War 
was launched. 
While the plans of the generals and the logistics of the war receive 
coverage in text and classroom, virtually nothing is said respecting the 
·Moroccans themselves, besides the important fact that much of the "Army of 
Africa"-- the spearhead ofthe coup-- was composed ofRegulares, Moroccan 
levies; by the end of the war, some 70,000 Moroccan troops had served in the 
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Nationalist army (Alpert 1984: 219, 224). In popular imagery, all that remains 
of this episode are anecdotes of cruelty and barbarism, a memory certainly 
reinforced by wartime propaganda. In short, Franco's moras, as they are 
generally thought of, continue to be viewed strictly as African mercenaries, 
and not as the products of a colonial policy expressly designed to destroy the 
political independence and the subsistence base of the Riffian tribes. 
Schools could certainly address some of these issues, and with profit. 
For instance, it is not too extreme to view the Moroccans in the Nationalist 
. army as the precursors of today's immigrants, filling a similar subordinate 
role in the ethnic division oflabor; it is also perfectly appropriate to consider 
the degree to which present day prejudice against Africans is rooted in the 
Civil War experience; and it is certainly within the scope of more advanced 
students to consider why the Republican government, fighting a long and 
bloody war against fascism, never offered independence to the inhabitants of 
Spanish Morocco. 63 
The point made earlier in this essay, that since Spain had lost its major 
overseas colonies during the nineteenth century the country did not experience 
the typical Western European end-of-empire crisis in this one, remains valid; 
what is important regarding Moroccan colonial history is the extent to which 
the country -- and its people -- continue to carry negative associations because 
of the Civil War and an earlier sequence of events and situations. Thus, in the 
collective memory, Morocco is still very much the place where thousands of 
Spanish conscripts lost their lives in a series of highly unpopular colonial 
campaigns. 
Morocco, North Africa, Islam, and moras, constitute a cluster of 
categories and associations that few Spaniards and few Catalans are 
indifererit to; attitudes tend to be quite firmly delineated and, consequently, 
opinions -- typically negative -- are readily expressed. In contrast, there is no 
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similar firm configuration respecting the native peoples of the Americas, 
historical or contemporary, probably because they are generally represented as 
the exotic inhabitants of an exotic environment. Somewhere between 
strongly-held opinion (whether negative or positive) and a certain invisibility 
lies the categorical and attributional space inhabited by Jews and, in 
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particular, by the historical Sephardic community. 
It is in part to this question of conceptual place that Shlomo Ben-Ami 
(1990), distinguished historian and former Israeli ambassador to Spain, turns 
his attention. Essentially, he points to a rupture, a violent historical 
separation, that put an end to a dynamic and pluralistic medieval Iberian 
culture. As he notes, 
In reality, it is not easy to trace a clear line of demarcation 
between Jewish culture and Arab culture in medieval Spain. 
The symbiosis was immense; without going any further, 
Jewish medieval literature was profoundly marked by the 
linguistic, stylistic and thematic influences ofthe great 
Arab literature (1990:10). 
The end ofwhat he describes as "the coexistence (convivencia) of the 
three historical civilizations of the Iberian peninsula" was, he notes, a tragedy 
for all concerned. The Jews, persecuted and expelled, lost a homeland: Sefarad 
--the name they gave to Spain-- where Jewish culture achieved a brilliance 
"probably only comparable to that of Jewish Vienna at the end of the [last] 
century"; the separation also did much to sever the links between what we now 
call the West and Islam; and an intellectually reduced Spain began a process 
of modern state-building by rejecting much -- primarily diversity -- that would 
have made it more pluralistic, indeed, more "modern." 
The moral, essentially, is the high price paid for narrowness of vision 
and bigotry, all very much part ofhegemonic structures of thought, although 
Ben-Ami is quick to point out that "historiography is not a tribunal to bring 
past times to trial; nor is the historian, however well documented, a judge" 
(Ben-Ami 1990:9). But this is not to deny that history instructs, and the author 
asks his reader to reflect upon what, in fact, will be commemorated when 
Spaniards, and much of the Western world, mark the Columbian 
Quincentennial; as he says, one will be able to find "versions and concepts to 
suit all tastes." 
It is, of course, appropriate, even necessary, to take careful note of the 
pain and the loss during this time of mythic remembrance. But beyond 
memory, the events and circumstances of half a thousand years ago also have 
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a particular pertinence to what is happening today in Spain and throughout 
Europe. Most obviously -- and very much keeping in mind the enormous 
changes and uphevals that have continued to rock Central Europe and the 
former Soviet Union in the four years since the dismantling of the Berlin Wall 
-- we are seeing a conjunction of liberalization, political self-determination and 
renovation, uncomfortably joined to ethnic conflict, policies of exclusion, 
growing racial prejudice and nationalistic chauvinism. Europe has the 
potential of regaining its centrality in a post-Cold War world (it is 
geographically and historically well positioned to do so), but only if material 
advances are linked to actions and ideologies based on genuine democracy and 
pluralistic values. This Europe, "from the Atlantic to the Urals," not only can 
transform itself, but extend a hand to the less privileged areas of the world --
including the inhabitants of its own internal peripheries. Unfortunately, as a 
French observer notes, "in the shadow there is another Europe, one dominated 
by the return of its past evil genius, fatally attracted by the dark temptations of 
xenophobia, racism and jingoism, desperately searching for its identity and 
using exclusion of others to express its inner fears" (Mo'isi 1990). As an 
antidote, she asks that Europeans move beyond the issues of economics, 
politics and traditional security concerns, to what she terms the "moral 
dimension," and within this sphere, a conscious effort to reexamine the past: 
The treatment of its past will be decisive for Europe's 
future. Countries cannot move forward without impunity 
if they are not reconciled with their past and, specifically, 
with their collective responsibility (Mo'isi 1990). 
How well is this being done in Spain -- and by extension, in Spanish 
schools? A reasonable answer is that the record is mixed. As noted earlier, a 
sense that the historic Sephardic community -- at that time the largest and 
most prosperous Jewish community in Europe -- had been the victim of a most 
grave injustice has long informed educated (and to some degree even popular) 
thinking in Spain. In more recent times, Spain has been a Jewish pla~e of 
refuge, as was the case during the Balkan wars and especially during the 
Holocaust. In the course of the past two decades, the Jewish community in 
Spain has increased in numbers, recognition and visibility, and part of this 
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visibility can be measured in the growing bibliography on Sephardic themes 
(El Pais [Temas], March 26, 1992; Marcias 1991). 
Three years ago, Spain's most prestigious prize, the Premio Principe de 
Asturias, was awarded, as a form of symbolic reparation, to the 700,000 
Sephardic Jews around the world. The response of Samuel Toledano, secretary 
general of the Spanish federation of Jewish communities, is worth quoting: "I 
am greatly satisfied by this reparation for the injustice done our ancestors 500 
years ago. But it is also a tribute that Spain is paying itself. It's are-encounter 
with its own past, its own identity" (The New York Times, June 3, 1990). At the 
ceremony, Prince Felipe de Borb6n accompanied the presentation with these 
words: "From the spirit of concord of the Spain of today, and as the heir of 
those who 500 years ago signed the decree of expulsion, I receive you with open 
arms and with great emotion" (El Pais [international edition], October 22, 
1990).64 A year later, King Juan Carlos came to New York to receive the 1991 
Humanitarian Award of the Elie Wiesel Fundation for Humanity. He was 
lauded for his firm commitment to democracy and for his role in helping to 
negotiate a Constitution that establishes the separation of church and state 
(The New York Times, October 5, 1991). On the quincentenary of the edict 
banishing the Jews (March 31, 1992), King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia, 
accompanied by President Haim Herzog of Israel, attended a solemn ceremony 
in the Madrid synagogue. In his declaration, the King paid homage to the 
long-exiled Jewish community and said that Sefarad was "no longer 
nostalgia" because the country was once again their home. As to history and 
the past, he said that "It may seem odd to choose the anniversary of a 
separation for a meeting of such profound significance," but that "the history 
of all people and, without doubt, that of Spain, if full of lights and shadows" (El 
Pais, Aprill, 1992; La Vanguardia, April1, 1992; Avui, April1, 1992; The New 
York Times, April 1, 1992). For its part, the Catalan Parliament passed a 
motion declaring the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 to have been "an act of 
religious intolerance and civil injustice" and recognizing the importance of 
the Jewish presence in Catalonia (Avui, April 3, 1992, June 10, 1992). 
In summary, there is convincing evidence that both official Spain and 
Spanish society as a whole are committed to recognizing a historical injustice. 
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With this there goes a willingness to express a sense of responsibility--
however delayed-- for a truly horrendous catalog of persecution and obloquy. 
The gesture of welcoming the Sephardim back to their ancestral homeland 
carries profound political and symbolic implications. What is at issue is not 
simply the past, but the reformulation the national memory. As is always the 
case when this takes place, the substantial reshaping of the national past 
necessarily entails the remaking of the national present and the national 
future. In particular, the sense of a plural past should help to reinforce the 
legitimacy of a pluralistic present. What I find particularly hopeful and 
valuable in the current discourse regarding Spain's Jewish past is that this 
engagement helps Spaniards avoid the comfortable conclusion that 
anti-Semitism is fundamentally a modern phenomenon emerging from the 
stresses of modernization and industrialization; in short, an experience that 
Spain largely avoided. The recognition-- often quite explicit in the writing of 
contemporary intellectuals-- that the anti-Judaism of the Middle Ages was not 
only a unique evil sustained over many centuries, but should be interpreted as 
ancestral to modern forms of anti-Semitism, is surely an important 
contribution to the building of a more just society. 
Although anti-Semitism continues to be found in Spain, and sometimes 
takes strange forms, it is hardly a flourishing ideology. 65 The schools, as noted 
earlier, have generally neglected the history of Spanish Jewry, and this neglect 
is very evident in the textbooks, publications that, in Spain as in most other 
countries, seldom mirror recent developments in social or historical thought. 
The most obvious changes have been at the top, and I would not underestimate 
the long-term political and cultural consequences ofthis willingness to 
confront, rather than suppress, the history of a particularly European, better 
said, Christian, design of prejudice and persecution. 
It is, of course, perfectly germane to note that the Jewish community in 
Spain is still tiny (there are some 15,000 practicing Jews), that the Sephardim 
are commonly perceived as a severed part of the Spanish patria -- "the 
wandering Spain"-- and that at least since the French Revolution a powerful 
political current in Western Europe has advocated the granting of full civil 
rights and liberties to Jewish compatriots (Kates 1990). Spain, with particular 
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touches of its own, is thus staking its place within the tradition ofWestern 
liberalism. 
There seems to be much less inclination, unfortunately, to address 
more recent injustices. One symbolically important example is the 
unwillingness of the government to make adequate compensation to the 
victims of Franco prisons and prison camps, an attitude that some have 
attributed to a readiness "to bury the past" (The New York Times, June 20, 
1990). It is, of course, much more comfortable not to have to remember that 
numerous Spaniards spent a decade or more in the Iberian equivalent of the 
Gulag; that democracy still has debts and obligations to meet (El Pais, May 6, 
1990). 
Injustices from the Civil War and the Franco period are fixed in time 
and many of the victims are already fast disappearing from the scene (which, 
of course, should add a sense of urgency). The major current civil rights issue,. 
the place of immigrants in Spanish society, is bound to grow in the years to 
come; Gypsies, while for the most part Spanish citizens, in many respects fit a 
conceptually similar structural category, and all the evidence indicates that 
they too are facing growing problems ofharassment and prejudice. One of the 
interesting -- and disturbing -- features of the whole discourse on immigration 
is the change that has taken place in roles and perceptions, for until very 
recently Spain was a major country of emigration. Even if we don't take at full 
face value the observation made by the diplomat Alvarez del Vayo (1973:127) 
two decades ago that "in Geneva today one hears more Spanish spoken than 
French," it is certainly true that Spaniards formed an important component of 
the postwar "guest worker" migration to richer and more industrialized 
countries. Understandably, Spaniards as a whole were at that time conscious 
of the need to protect immigrant rights. 
What has happened in the interval is that Spain has been transformed 
into a relatively prosperous country enjoying a standard of living that 
compares favorably to that of its neighbors.66 As one might expect, this 
· circumstance has been attracting substantial immigration, much of it, as we 
have seen, from Mrica. Immigrants claim, and ample documentation bears 
them out, that in Spain they face not only day-to-day abuse and prejudice, but 
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an official attitude that is hostile to outsiders, in particular to people of color. 
In 1990, a report by the European Commission in Brussels (hardly an 
anti-establishment body) strongly criticized the Spanish government for a 
failure to implement a humane immigration policy noting, among other 
shortcomings, "the restrictive clauses of the immigration law," and the 
"poverty, lack of housing, absence of educational opportunities and of health 
services" that are the lot of most Third World immigrants in Spain (for a full 
discussion of the EC report, see El Pais [international edition], May 28, 1990; 
also an earlier Caritas (1987) report and La Vanguardia, February 17, 1987). 
Nor, as we noted in the preceding chapter, are the numbers inconsequential, 
although, by the very nature of the problem, statistics are problematic. The EC 
study gives a total ofjust under 800,000 foreigners in Spain (a somewhat larger 
figure than the estimate in most Spanish sources), with about half this 
number subject to what it terms "economic discrimination." The report is fully 
consistent with other available information. This includes the protests and 
appeals -- some 3,000 in the course of 1989 -- lodged with the Catalan Sindic de 
Greuges (an official ombudsman). In his annual report to the Catalan 
Parliament, the sindic took special note of the harshness and insensitivity of 
official legislation and of the policies and measures applied by municipalities 
to the detriment of minorities, including long-established Gypsy communities 
(El Pais, May 23, 1990). Finally, over 30,000 foreigners are detained by the police 
every year, and some 5,000 are expelled from the country. About one-third of 
each category are Moroccans (El Pais [international edition], June 11, 1990). 
These figures, and the policies that they represent, offer us an insight 
into official thinking, and it is not particularly enlightened or progressive, 
although a recent amnesty could end up benefiting some 100,000 illegal 
immigrants (El Pais, December 16, 1991). Popular opinion may actually be 
more tolerant than government action: in a recent public opinion poll, just over 
50 per cent of the respondents were in favor of permitting illegal immigrants to 
acquire legal residence, and about the same percentage supported an open 
door policy for political refugees (El Pais [international edition], June 11, 1990; 
see also surveys reported in The Guardian, October 4, 1991; The New York 
Times December 1, 1991). The overall picture, however, is anything but 
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satisfactory. 
Fundamentally, it seems that many Spaniards are in the process of 
crystallizing a mind-set that increasingly defines "Europe" narrowly; or 
expressed differently, that what has been variously called "the European house 
of freedom" and "the common European home" will have exclusivity as one of 
its prime characteristics and, at least implicitly, a categorization substantially 
defined by race. Needless to say, this is not even a particularly accurate picture 
of what constitutes present-day Western Europe with its millions of citizens 
and residents of Mrican and Asian origin, but the underlying assumption, 
that the coming [Western] "Europe without frontiers" should also be a body 
with well·nigh impenetrable external boundaries, is not much altered by the 
presence of South Asians in Britain, Turks in Germany, and North Africans 
in France. In all of this, the official Spanish attitude is really not much 
different from that found in the rest of the EC; a sad irony that Spain has 
realized in this manner its desire to be truly European. 
Restrictive immigration policies are supported by a variety of official 
arguments and popular impressions. Very often invoked, as we discussed 
earlier, is the claim that immigrants reduce employment opportunities for 
Spaniards, although much of the work now done by immigrants would in all 
likelihood not be undertaken by natives (El Pais [international edition], 
December 17, 1990; Cambio 16, July-August 1990). The jobs argument --
especially when presented in "neutral" terms -- obscures a much deeper 
anxiety: a fear concerning the relationship of immigrantion to crime and to 
social marginality in general. The issue has been covered extensively in the 
press (La Vanguardia [Libros], January 12, 1990; El Pais [international 
edition], April1, 1991; El Pais [international edition], October 14, 1991). The 
director of the Spanish Red Cross Center for Assistance to Foreigners is 
undoubtedly correct in his assessment that "people see refugees sleeping in the 
parks, and last summer some of them were caught selling drugs on the Plaza 
de Espafi.a [Madrid], and they make stereotypical judgments" (Whitney 1991:8). 
The matter, though, goes beyond the construction of simplistic popular 
perceptions. In Spain, as elsewhere in Europe, the last few years have 
witnessed an upsurge in anti-immigrant and anti-Gypsy violence, much of it 
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related to the actual or supposed criminal activities of members of these 
groups. 67 In a very recent episode, the townspeople of Mancha Real -- led by 
the Socialist mayor, no less -- sacked and burned the houses of four Gypsy 
families (another was torched some days later) after Gypsies were accused of 
killing a bar owner. The Guardia Civil did nothing to protect Gypsy residents, 
nor did it apprehend the incendiaries; shopkeepers refused to sell food to Gypsy 
families (El Pais [international edition], May 27, 1991, and El Pais, July 5, 6, 
and 13, 1991). In the aftermath of these events, a group in another town banded 
together to form a "Payo [i.e. non-Gypsy] front" to fight "parasitical" Gypsies 
reputedly involved in the drug traffic (El Pais, July 8, 1991). Some months 
later, residents oflarger communities, including a group from a district in 
Barcelona, organized vigilante squads to chase out drug dealers and other 
"undesirables" (El Pais [international edition], October 14, 1991). 
The violence of these and similar cases calls for careful and considered 
examination. I would agree with the columnist Rosa Montero (1991:48), who 
wrote a piece appropriately titled Miedo C'Fear"), that it is much too 
comfortable for readers to assume that the people of Mancha Real are "human 
monsters"-- and hence, not really like the rest of us. She blames fear, noting 
that "fear is a degrading sentiment that frustrates clear thinking," and goes 
on to write that "I see racism grow in Europe, nourished by the insecurity of 
our wellbeing, by the fear of the poor .... because the indigent come in millions. 
They are copper-colored, black or brown. They are, above all, poorly-educated 
and needy" (Montero 1991:48). She asks us to ponder how and why ordinary 
villagers are transformed into a lynch mob; how one person's possible guilt 
can be used to condemn a whole group. A palpable fear is evident in a very 
recent Op-Ed piece written by Herrero de Mifion (1992:31), a conservative 
Spanish parliamentarian. Taking an incongruous leaf from Karl Marx's 
Manifesto, he insists that it is a "reality" and not a "specter" that "is haunting 
Europe," and that its name is immigration. In his opinion, "this is a problem 
that, in the long run, very seriously imperils the security and identity of our 
society and, in more immediate terms, its democratic stability." 
That this fear finds substantial resonance in Spanish society is hardly 
in doubt. In fact, a similar combination of anxiety and xenophobia have 
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characterized anti-Gypsy and anti-immigrant violence from Poland to Spain 
(Miller 1991; The New York Times, March 24, July 25, November 24; November 
27, 1991, February 9, 1992; El Pais, July 22, 1991). For the most part, 
governments have abdicated leadership, and the press has not always· behaved 
much more valiantly.68 What, for instance, is one to make of the headline in 
the Barcelona daily, Avui (July 24, 1991) -- "Crimes in Catalonia would be 
reduced by one-third with the expulsion offive-hundred foreigners"-- other 
than a pandering to fear? As is so often the case, there is a lack of context, a 
lack of perspective, in these common reactions. Gypsy traffickers do exist, a 
Gypsy spokesman in Madrid concedes, "but they are a tiny minority. Drug 
trafficking is a problem that affects all Spanish society," an opinion supported 
by drug enforcement authorities (The New York Times, October 12, 1991). 
Fundamentally, Gypsies and immigrants have become scapegoats for 
many of the current social and economic ills of Spanish society (a situation 
that again parallels that in many other European countries), and they can 
count on few mainstream defenders. The established parties of the left have 
not (as one might have hoped) moved to take up roles of advocacy and ' 
explanation, and neither have the autonomous governments. That this failure 
to sponsor the cause of those most on the margins of society raises 
contradictions for political organizations that define themselves as 
progressive, goes without saying; at another level, the failure of Spaniards as a 
whole to identify with such an important human rights issue has strained 
Spain's self-image as a humane and tolerant country. The newest variation on 
the immigration theme is the anxiety that a tide of immigrants might descend 
from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (El Pais, September 30, 
1991). In this case as well, Spain's reluctance to help in more than very limited 
ways, is similar to to the response of other Western European countries (Ash, 
Mertes and Mo'isi 1991). 
There are, however, some hopeful signs. Early in 1992, Spain witnessed 
its first massive demonstrations against racism. In the Barcelona 
, demonstration, some 30,000 people paraded through downtown with a variety 
ofbanners and placards, including one that read "Stop Racism! For a Quality 
Multicultural Education." Other participants shouted, "Racism no, work yes," 
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and -- the theme of the demonstration -- "Don't hurt my friend" (El Pais, 
February 22, 1992; Avui, February 24, 1922). More recently, following the 
murder of a Dominican immigrant in Madrid, there were further marches 
and demonstrations (El Pais [international edition], November 23, 1992). 
These events illustrate a change that was just beginning to appear five 
years ago at the time of the study, what we may call a shift in paradigms and 
vocabularies. Historically-- certainly in recent history-- social and political 
classifications have been structured either on the basis of class or that of 
internal ethnicity and nationality. The important boundaries of power -- and 
this was very much the case in Barcelona -- were marked by class, and in 
particular by the on-going struggles of an emerging proletariat expressed 
through political resistance and popular ritual (Kaplan 1992). Race, per se, 
hardly figured in either popular or professional discussion. Class and 
nationality continue to be the prime measures of definition, but race, 
particularly in popular parlance, is entering the vocabulary, but still without 
very much of a sense of historical frame of reference (although this may be 
changing). 
The result is that one finds both a reluctance to recognize racism-- "we 
are not racists" is a phrase that I have heard repeated countless times -- and 
the voicing of manifestly racist sentiments, often unrecognized as such by the 
speakers. Mainstream opinion has borrowed a great deal of the vocabulary 
that had previously been utilized to describe the metropolitan underclass and 
applied it without much change to recent immigrants. Itinerants and casual 
foreign workers, and marginals of one type or another, are commonly 
identified by a predictable repetition of negative terms: dirty, noisy, dangerous, 
criminal, drug-dealing, uncivil and uncivilized. There are, of course, some 
attributes of alterity that are novel, particularly those having to do with a 
reputed lack of hygiene: by now I have come across "the myth of the goat in the 
bath" on several occasions, for this is supposedly the locus of choice for 
Muslims to undertake the slaughter their goats. 69 
At the same time, many ordinary citizens are likely to insist that the 
fundamental problems in relation to immigration are those of employment 
security and public safety, and not really matters of race or culture, except, of 
93 
course, that foreigners must be willing to meet certain European standards. 
What I have been suggesting in these paragraphs is that the old idioms are no 
longer really adequate to express the shifts that are taking place in Spain and 
Catalonia; that the salient division of class is beginning to be modified by 
considerations of race which more accurately reflect a new set of economic and 
cultural inequalities. 
To conclude, there are sundry societal problems and issues that could 
begin to be addressed as Spain finishes marking an anniversary with so many 
different, and for some still very painful, associations. The educational system, 
at all levels, has an unprecedented opportunity of relating past to present: the 
Columbian discovery of America (the initial step in European hegemony); the 
expulsion ofthe Jews; the conquest of Granada; the origins ofroyal despotism; 
the victory of religious intolerance -- but also the end of the Middle Ages and 
the beginnings of the modern world. As the Andre Sassoon, vice president of 
the International Jewish Committee's "Sepharad '92" expressed it with 
reference to the goal ofhis organization, "because of the Jewish experience as 
victims of intolerance and group hatred, we have learned and affirmed the 
virtues of coexistence, mutual respect and harmony between groups and 
nations" (The New York Times, October 25, 1990), words of obvious relevance to 
the changing face of Europe and to the racial and cultural reconfiguration that 
is taking place in Spain. 
Indeed, the same sense of shared experience which Sassoon mentions 
has been making itself felt in Spain. I know that my friends and informants 
have been glued to their television sets as the catastrophe in the former 
Yugoslavia unfolds. In particular, the agony of Bosnia Herzogovina has 
touched a genuinely deep chord in the Spanish population. Some 10,000 
families from all parts of the state have written to relief organizations and to 
the Spanish Foreign Ministry offering their homes to refugees. No response on 
the same scale has taken place in other parts of Europe. Spanish respondents 
explain their actions with reference to the experience of their families during 
· the Spanish Civil War; as one woman phrased it, "What I've seen on TV of the 
war is what I have lived when I was 13 (The New York Times, December 27, 
1992). Most of the refugees arriving in Spain are Bosnian Muslims, but a group 
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of Bosnian Sephardic Jews have settled in Catalonia (Avui, September 14, 
1992). Clearly, at some level and for some people, the terrible Spanish past still 
has the capacity to mobilize action and sentiment. 
My sense is that the teachers I worked with, given support, are 
psychologically and pedagogically up to the task of tackling new issues, of 
affirming the virtues of decency, coexistence and tolerance. As a profession, 
they strike me as considerably more autonomous and more secure in their role 
than American teachers are reported to be (Landes 1976:401; Sachar 1991; 
Brown 1991). There are serious problems, as indicated in several places in this 
study, with features of the instructional system and its underlying ideology; 
and; most obviously, the conceptual tools for explaining and analyzing the 
multicultural and interconnected aspects of the world that the children are 
growing up in are inadequate. Counterbalancing these debits is a strong 
anti-establishment, anti-hegemonic, tradition in the teaching profession, -and 
something I encountered in all the schools-- a genuine desire to learn on the 
part of pupils and a commitment to education and its emancipatory values on 
the part of teachers. I regard it as hopeful that students from working-class 
backgrounds do not find it culturally necessary to repudiate the school 
environment, a rebelliousness that in the United States and in Britain has had 
the unintended consequence of limiting learning, foreclosing the possibilities 
of mobility, and hence helping to reproduce capitalist class relations (Willis 
1981). 
In Spain, education for the poor is still novel enough to be seen as a 
genuine door to opportunity and a better future. Furthermore, in my 
particular case, the working class children who were my respondents typically 
came from immigrant (southern Spanish) families, with all that this 
generally implies respecting positive attitudes towards education and work. 
My sense is that growing national prosperity and higher living 
standards, if joined to appropriate fiscal and political policies, can indeed 
improve the quality ofeducation at all levels, although these trends will 
certainly not alter the privileged role of private secondary schools -- at least not 
for a long time to come. While the educational system now being planned and 
discussed is not the one originally proposed by progressive political groups and 
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most of the teachers themselves, it is clearly far superior to the model 
inherited from the Franco regime. We should also note that, as a European 
Community country, all educational levels and standards will, in the years to 
come, be brought into parity with those of other member states. 
Fundamentally, this is good news for Spanish education and for Spanish 
children. 
My main concern remains that of race and marginality in the Europe 
of the 1990s. Specifically, will their new-found place among the wealthy blind 
Spaniards, and in particular the next generation, to the many remaining 
internal and external iniquities? Will it deter them from questioning the new 
set of hegemonic premises that define Western Europe as a territory of 
privilege? Needless to say, even a partial answer to this question will require 
work among the new immigrant population, and perhaps in particular the 
younger people. 
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NOTES 
1. The past, quite evidently, is in demand. It is being commoditized through 
such instrumentalities as the concept of "heritage" and the simulated 
antiquity of locations like Williamsburg. Also, pasts are commonly 
perceived as the special patrimony of particular groups or classes. The 
success of Alex Haley's Roots (1977) is but the most obvious American 
example. 
2. On the Gramscian approach see Femia (1981) and Hoffmann (1984). The 
case for analyzing history in terms of present requirements was 
particularly well articulated by Croce (1941:19): "however remote in time 
events ... may seem to be, the history refers to present needs and present 
situations wherein these events vibrate." Contemporary cultural 
analysis utilizes a similar mode that stresses the dynamic, shifting, and 
even contested nature of cultural domains (Comaroff 1985; Geertz 1980; 
Appadurai 1966, 1988; Taussig 1980). 
3. I did come across a political cartoon from 1886 in a history text. The 
cartoon is used to illustrate the poor opinion in which politicians were 
held in the nineteenth century. It shows four politicians dressed as 
Gypsies with the caption: "Changing governments makes no difference, 
they all fleece the country. One group is just as much Gypsies as the 
others" (Tan gitanos son els uns com els altres) (Garcia et al. 1986:285). 
That Gypsies were used a century ago to represent criminality is not 
surprising, but that the stereotype is reproduced in a modern school text 
without further comment is a good measure ofhow little attitudes have 
changed. 
4. The literature on the transition has become quite voluminous. Among 
the more important works in English are Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo 
Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (1981), Christopher Abel and 
Nissa Torrents (eds.), Spain: Conditional Democracy (1984), and Stanley 
G. Payne (ed.), The Politics ofDemocratic Spain (1986). 
5. Jordi Pujol, President of the Catalan Autonomous Government for the 
past decade, was one of those who were imprisoned under Franco for 
acts of cultural and political resistance. 
6. Fear of what might occur if a consensual solution could not be worked 
out did much to bring the various political forces (some of them still not 
legalized) to the negotiation table. Previous major democratic 
transformations (1810, 1869, 1931) took place in the context of an 
institutional vacuum and the sudden irruption of the populace onto the 
political stage. Much of the credit for devising a peaceful process of 
change must go to two individuals: King Juan Carlos and Adolfo Suarez, 
who became premier of the first reform government in July of 1976. On 
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the utility of the "Spanish model" for sundry dictatorships seeking a 
road to democracy, see James Markham's "There's a Demand for 
Instruction in Democracy," The New York Times, April16, 1989. Fear, 
he believes, was "a key factor in the transition," as was the willingness of 
Spain to turn "its back on old scores, and on its own blood-stained 
history." 
7. A desire to be regarded as "European" has not been uncommon in 
societies that, for one reason or another, have had this status questioned. 
In a case just prior to the collapse of the Romanian dictatorship, a group 
of former Romanian CP leaders castigated the policies of President 
Ceausescu [then still in power] and reminded him that "Romania is and 
remains a European country" and that "you cannot remove Romania to 
Africa" (The New York Review, April27, 1989, p. 9). The issue, of course, 
is not who is or is not "European," but what meaning is given to this 
conceptual category. 
8. The process of selection is via entrance examinations and the various 
facultades (schools or colleges) establish their respective standards. 
Selectividad was first introduced in 197 4 and has always been strongly 
opposed by the majority ofwould-be university students. 
9. Traditional structures of power came under severe pressure with the 
collapse of the Spanish antiguo regimen early in the nineteenth century, 
a period that also coincided with the loss of the mainland American 
colonies. / 
10. "El hijo del madero, ala Universidad para que no sea como su papa" (El 
Pais, February 17, 1987, p. 14). Madero can be translated as 
"club-wielder." 
11. Children in Catalonia study both Spanish history and Catalan national 
history. In either case, this past can be linked to periods of much greater 
political power and economic influence than either Spain or Catalonia 
today enjoy. 
12. A number of students I talked to commented on what they felt was the 
unfairness of the political directorate in limiting educational 
opportunities ("Not long ago they were the demonstrators"; "Now that 
they have power, they don't care about students' demands"). One of the 
paradoxes of the whole situation was that Jose Maria Maravall, before 
becoming Minister of Education, had made his sociological reputation by 
writing extensively on popular resistance to the Franco regime. 
13. , Salvador de Madariaga, who was briefly Minister of Education in the 
1930s, was shocked to discover that "the schoolmaster class, like every 
other class of public servants in Spain, carried an overwhelming 
deadweight oftime-servers and salary-hunters" (de Madariaga 1943:317). 
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Gramsci (Forgacs1988: 277), undoubtedly influenced by the Italian case, 
noted "the phenomenon of the saturation and fossilization of civil service 
personnel and intellectuals." 
14. During the Franco regime, individuals who had been associated with the 
Institucion Libre de Ensefi.anza were specifically barred from the 
teaching profession (Lopez: 1986: 54). 
15. The most exhaustive analysis of the Franco regime policy of institutional 
dismemberment in Catalonia is provided by Benet (1978). Among other 
materials, he cites the report of Alfonso Iniesta, inspector of primary 
education, that in Barcelona the Generalitat schools had 75,000 children 
enrolled, schools maintained by the city of Barcelona another 30,000, 
while state schools accounted for only 8,000 children (Benet 1978:319). The 
same inspector described the Catalan schools as staffed by "young and 
able personnel," having at their disposal "abundant supplies and 
complete installations"; their "sin" was a failure to teach a pro-Spanish 
curriculum (Benet 1978:319-320). 
16. I have in mind individuals such as Gregorio Marafi.on who was both a 
noted scientist and an important historian of the golden age. Somewhat 
earlier, the "Generation of98" --an assortment of scholars, writers, and 
journalists-- created a rich and diversified intellectual climate within 
which the process of societal self-examination could take place. 
17. The ideological orientation often termed "national-Catholicism" was 
particularly important in education since the church was the dominant 
institution in primary and secondary education during the early Franco 
era. Later, elements within the church, most obviously the Opus Dei lay 
organization, played important technical and technocratic roles. 
18. I am quoting the general syllabus for third year of secondary education. 
Teachers are supposed to elaborate from these guidelines. 
19. As late as 1958, 28 per cent of the test materials in the oposiciones for 
entry-level teachers dealt with ideological matters (political and and 
religious). All the boards of examiners included representatives of the 
church and the Movimiento (Lopez 1986:56). 
20. In 1980 -- some three years after the basic educational consensus had 
been worked out in Madrid -- the Catalan Socialist Party Program still 
called for "a public, secular, unified, free, autonomous, and Catalan 
school" (Programa de Gobierno Socialista 1980:207). 
21. Taped interview with Professor Isabel Gomez, Escola de Mestres Sant 
Cugat, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, March 5, 1987. See also, 
Experimentacio de la Reforma Educativa 1986. 
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22. Interview, Isabel Gomez, March 5, 1987; 
23. This is a theme that finds expression in several of the studies on 
educational planning published by the Generalitat, specifically Vol. 1 of 
Experimentaci6 del Cicle Superior d'Educaci6 General Basica (1985), and 
Vols. 1 and 2 of Experimentaci6 del Primer Cicle d'Ensenyament 
Secundari (1985). 
24. One of the consequences of the oposiciones system is that it makes for 
rigid and self-perpetuating professional baronies. It is those who have 
already won professional standing that constitute the examination 
boards. To this problem must be added the matter of reduced resources: 
in a classical example of "limited good" theory, established university 
departments tend to view new fields or new programs as posing a threat 
to their funding levels. Proposed university reform will expand the 
recognized professions (carreras) from about 50 to 150, but if it is to prove 
successful, this plan will require greatly increased allocations. 
25. Several studies, mostly sociological in orientation, examine youth and 
youth culture in Catalonia and in Spain as a whole (Cardus and Estruch 
1984; Casal 1985; Feixa 1986; Zarraga 1985; Funes i Artiaga 1985). For a 
recent nonacademic survey of attitudes see Cambio 16, July 6, 1987. The 
reality of youth sexuality is recognized in several programs and 
publications. The Barcelona city government has launched "Plan 
Diana," a program for fourteen- and fifteen-year olds, designed to teach 
sexuality and contraception (including hands-on knowledge of different 
devices), and to acquaint young people with family planning services. 
These services are free, immediate, and anonymous. In its "Guide for 
Youth," the Ministry of Culture notes that "sexuality is autonomous 
from procreation" and and asks young people to be responsible and 
informed (Ministerio de Cultura1984:148). 
26. The sexual and extramarital activities of Spanish politicians merit little 
comment in the Spanish press. The Gary Hart/Donna Rice affair, 
covered extensively in newspapers and magazines (Cambio 16, May 18, 
1987, and May 25, 1987), tended to portray Americans as "puritanic" and 
the fortunes of politicians as particularly vulnerable to charges of 
"scandal." 
27. Due to very high levels of unemployment, there is a substantial segment 
of marginalized, alienated youth living the Spanish equivalent of "street 
life". I have had little direct contact with such young people. Much of the 
terminology used by youth "sects" to categorize themselves and others--
"punks," "rockers," "heavies," "skins," "techno-pops" and the like-- is 
obviously of foreign derivation. 
28. Awareness of the problem and being in a position to do much about it are 
different things. I was made very conscious of this after spending a good 
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part of a Sunday morning with a colleague of mine and his teenaged son. 
Our immediate concern was to ease the anxiety of the boy by seeing how 
well he had memorized the apunts, after which we tried to address the 
issue of "meaning." The father, a university professor, detested the 
system he saw as a symptom ofthe country's educational shortcomings, 
but felt that he had no choice but to help his son master it. Similarly, 
many teachers who find the emphasis on notes intellectually stifling, 
believe that students must learn how to "defend themselves" by learning 
appropriate note-taking. 
m. The names I have chosen bear some broad categorical resemblance--
literary figures, Catalan personages, patron saints, etc.-- to the names of 
the schools studied. It is also possible that there are actual schools that 
carry the pseudonyms I have assigned, but if so, this is simply 
coincidence. 
W. CEPEPC (CoHectiu d'Escoles per a l'Escola Publica Catalana) is made 
up of73 schools, 55 ofwhich have already passed into the public system. 
This transference has not been without problems: some schools fear the 
loss of enrichment programs (art, music, etc.), others their autonomy 
and/or their present faculties. (El Pais, July 17, 1987; Avui, June 24, 
1987). Many educators I spoke to were of the opinion that the Generalitat 
had shown remarkably little concern for these institutions. 
n. I noticed some definite problems in introducing "non-traditional" 
educational forms. A "cultural week" in one of the schools, a four-day 
hiatus from the normal round of education, functioned more as an 
in-house holiday than as a serious attempt to integrate materials and 
perspectives from different courses or as an opportunity to discuss and 
consider important current issues. 
l2. Taped interview with Professor Montserrat Treserra, Universitat 
Autonoma de Barcelona, February 26, 1987. 
l3. The balance is not explicitly stated, but is evident in such features as a 
table of military and civilian casualties -- "The Civil War Cost Spain 
Many Lives" -- that arrives at virtually identical figures for the two sides 
(Equipo Aula 3 1985:183). Such tables substitute the apparent authority of 
numbers for explanation, or even for some sense of the problems of daily 
life during the war. 
34. Textbooks are changing and new texts are planned for the expansion in 
obligatory education. Good and stimulating texts, such as Sepharad 
(Garcia et al. 1986), are already available, as is a fine collection of 
documents (Ballarini et al. 1983) published for secondary school students. 
Cost, however, often slows the acquisition of newer texts. 
35. Taped interview with Professor Joan Pages, Escola de Mestres Sant 
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Cugat, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, April2, 1987. I raised some 
of the same questions with classroom teachers. In one particular 
instance, I tried to ascertain why so little use was made of a book 
assigned as a supplementary text, Ronald Fraser's (1979) gripping oral 
history of the Civil War. Time was one reason, the need to prepare 
students for upcoming exams was another. 
36. Obviously, the parents or grandparents of many of the children at Valle 
Inclan left the south to escape poverty and related evils. That teachers 
(most ofwhom are of middle class origin) might be hesitant to discuss 
the conditions of rural life as they were until quite recently is not 
surprising since poverty is commonly associated with low socioeconomic 
standing and lack of cultura. Teachers in other schools, it should be 
noted, also did not devote a great deal of attention to recent rural misery. 
37. The immigrant experience, the poverty that preceded it, and the 
problems of making a life in the new urban environment have not gone 
entirely unrecorded and unremembered. Francisco/Francesc Candel 
(1957; 1964; 1986) has written an acclaimed series of novels detailing the 
hard personal and cultural journey that such transformations entail. 
His novels -- gritty and objective -- initially caused a sensation, for they 
depicted a world that was virtually unknown to the literate classes. 
38. It should be stressed that professional historians, both Spanish and 
foreign, have not neglected the Jewish experience in Iberia, although the 
interpretation is often self-serving. Many Catalans, especially of the older 
generation, unabashedly define themselves as pro-Israeli in the context 
of the Middle East conflict. It is not unusual to meet Catalans who claim, 
typically on the basis of their family name, a Jewish ancestry. None of 
this, however, changes the general and popular notion that the Jewish 
past of Iberia falls into the domain of archives and museums. 
39. For an overview of Jews in Catalonia see the special issue ofL'Aven£ 
(No. 81, 1985), "Jueus a Catalunya". 
40. One might note also that the history of Barcelona offers some insights on 
modern religiously (and culturally) divided cities (Belfast, Beirut, 
Jerusalem, etc.) and on that weaving together of national and religious 
loyalties that we generally refer to as "fundamentalism." A reader of the 
manuscript noted at this point in the text that I seemed to be speaking 
more to Spanish and Catalan teachers than to anthropologists. If so, it is 
because I believe that an anthropologically-informed curriculum would 
greatly facilitate the examination of important issues that now receive 
limited or guarded attention. Part of the problem is that of finding the 
intellectual language to discuss such matters. 
41. The redefining of places of worship by the dominant culture/religion is, 
of course, not limited to Spain. The great basilica of Saint Sofia in 
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Constantinople became a mosque. In Spain, synagogues (most notably 
those ofToledo) were transformed into churches. In the New World, the 
conquistadores could not really make over Mesoamerican temples into 
churches (the styles and functions were too different), but they did the 
next best thing: they built many colonial churches on top of the temple 
platforms. Recent Spanish history offers several examples of much the 
same hegemonic process at work. For instance, the political culture of 
the Franco regime redefined by fiat everything that was non-Castilian 
(historical institutions and personages, even toponyms and personal 
names) as "Spanish". For a provocative discussion of the relationship 
between material culture (in particular archaeology), ideology and 
nationalism in the modern Middle East see Silberman (1990). The whole 
issue ofhow cultural resource management (CRM) can be interpreted as 
a modern mode of appropriation is germane to our argument, but beyond 
the scope ofthis essay. 
:1:2. Needless to say, this stress on the material lends itself to a guide book 
approach to history, of which an interesting example is the Spanish 
Tourist Office's Viaje por la Espana judia ("Journey Through Jewish 
Spain") (lnprotur 1985). This instructive pamphlet helps the tourist track 
the vestiges of Spanish Sephardic communities. 
:1:3. This is generally referred to as La crisis del antiguo regimen (ca. 1800-
1830), which we might render as the failure of eighteenth-century 
enlightened despotism to transform Spain into a modern liberal society. 
The expectations, and eventual disappointments, of the Spanish 
Enlightenment provide the dominant theme of a recent Goya exhibit, 
Goya and the Spirit of the Enlightenment (Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, 
January 18-March 26, 1989). This interpretation of Goya and his time is 
totally congruent with how the period is taught in Spanish schools. 
:1:4. I am discussing the current situation. It is well known that the Franco 
regime (especially in its earlier phases) sponsored a historical 
interpretation that blamed Spain's many vicissitudes on a combination of 
alien powers and internal treason. The very terminology of this 
propaganda-- the Civil War as "Crusade," the West as "corrupt," the 
Republicans as "puppets ofFreemasonry," etc.-- is fundamentally 
anti-modern. 
4:5. Slavery and the slave trade were, in fact, closely linked to the early 
nineteenth century transformation of Catalan commerce and industry 
(Fradera 1987). 
46. Another good source is the fine selection of documents, "La construcci6n 
de la Espana democratica 1975-1982" (The Construction of a Democratic 
Spain 1975-1982), in Ballarini et al. (1983 [Part 2]: 251-275). There is more 
than enough stimulating material in this collection for several lectures 
and discussions on the current political system. 
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47. An extensive body of literature, much of it anthropological, has been 
produced on Spanish Gypsies. One cannot speak of a unitary 11Gypsy 
culture11 or a single 11Gypsy language. 11 It is reasonable to think of 
Spanish Gypsies (gitanos) as a stigmatized minority that, although 
highly acculturated, remains unassimilated. Statistics on Gypsies are 
notoriously unreliable, but the ballpark population figure for Spain is 
half a million or more, by far the largest concentration in Western 
Europe (Puxon 1980). It is of more than passing interest to note that 
Gypsies in Eastern Europe-- who had always resisted 11actually existing 
socialism11 --are today being made scapegoats for the many problems 
faced by post-Communist societies (Beck 1989, 1991; 11Poles Vent Their 
Economic Rage on Gypsies, 11 The New York Times, July 25, 1991; 
11Groping for Minority Rights, 11 The Economist, July 13, 1991). 
48. The opinions of my informants reflect quite closely general, and even 
official, perceptions of the relationship between foreign immigration and 
social problems. There is a sense that delinquency, especially violent 
crime, has grown, although some statistics indicate that since 1983 
crime rates have stabilized, perhaps even dropped a bit (for a detailed 
analysis see Martin 1990). What has undoubtedly increased is the sense 
ofinsecurity, with the inhabitants of the large cities feeling particularly 
at risk. Officials liken the Spanish immigration problem to that ofthe 
United States, with Morocco playing a role analogous to Mexico (Avui, 
April2, 1987, Cambia 16, February 9 and 16, 1987, The New York Times, 
August 24, 1989). Within Europe, the situation is somewhat similar to 
that of Italy which, officials claim, operates as a natural bridge between 
the poorer south and the richer northern shores of the Mediterranean; 
there too, immigration issues have provoked racial conflict and 
increasingly stringent controls (11Gateway to Europe, 11 The Economist, 
April 28, 1990; 11Poor Men at the Gate, 11 The Economist, March 16, 1991). 
49. Almost everyone can cite one or two examples of successful African 
immigrants (Latin American political refugees obviously fall into 
another conceptual catergory), but the truth of the matter is that there 
are very few black or brown faces in positions of influence and power. 
The first judge of North African origin was appointed about a year ago 
and I have yet to meet, in more than two decades of work in Spain; a 
teacher or professor of African ancestry. Perhaps most obviously, there is 
virtually no immigrant and/or post-colonial art and literature of the sort 
produced by such English language artists and writers as Salman 
Rushdie, Kazuo Ishiguro, HanifKureishi and Nadine Gordimer. These 
works are at least in part designed to expand European consciousness 
(for a discussion of the genre and its significance see Fischer and Abedi 
1990). 
50. For a comparable type of 11distancing11 I have to delve back into my 
childhood in England. Two instances come readily to mind: 11Camp11 
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brand coffee extract, the label showing a colonial officer being served by a 
turbaned Indian bearer, and the "golliwog," a rather grotesque black 
rag-doll then found in every toy shop. In that England of the late 1930s 
and 1940s, people from south Asia were few and far between and resident 
blacks even scarcer. In present-day America we have a phenomenon of a 
similar order in the use of Native American stereotypes in sports 
(Washington Redskins, Atlanta Braves, the Fighting Illini [a 
long-extinct Native American people from whom Illinois took its name], 
and until recently, the University of Massachusetts Redmen). We do not 
have teams with appellations such as "Darkies" or "Polacks". 
51. La vida en un xip, Joaquim Puyal, host. Aired Friday, January 19, 1990. 
Produced by TV 3, Barcelona. Other episodes have dealt with class, 
generational issues, gender and sexuality, and changing patterns of 
behavior. The program has successfully joined the soap opera format to 
serious public debate, and viewers are not at all reluctant to invest the 
better part of a Friday night to watching it. 
52. My impression is that a considerable segment of the studio audience had 
--at the conscious level-- a quite developed sense of what constituted 
proper and reasonable attitudes towards race. In the simplest of terms, 
the educated citizens of a modern, progressive society are not supposed to 
use "race" as a criterion ofjudgment. Since for many a prejudice of this 
type is morally and socially untenable, discussion and commentary is 
likely to shift to issues of"culture," "custom," "behavior," and so forth--
elements that are presumed to be mutable. This puts the onus of change 
firmly on the shoulders of the minority or minorities in question and also 
permits the majority to applaud particularly successful examples of 
assimilation. 
53. I particularly have in mind much of the the coverage of Islam and 
related issues, including the status and security of Spain's two North 
African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. See especially "El retorno de 
Islam," Cambia 16, February 9, 1987, and "El drama de Melilla, lo que 
nosjugamos," Cambia 16, February 16, 1987. Needless to say, the fact 
that many Spaniards fear for the safety of these two pieces of North 
African territory (which Spain defines as "European" [El Pais, April2, 
1987]) simply adds another element of tension, a further reason to 
distrust Arabs in general. While one can point to specific historical, 
political, and geographical reasons underpinning anti-Arab feeling in 
Spain, a recent survey in France noted "a soft anti-Maghreb recism 
spreading like an oil-slick" and found that three-quarters of those 
questioned for the report thought there were too many Arabs in France 
("Mighty Le Pen," The Economist, May 12, 1990; see also "France Seeks a 
Way to Cope With New Upsurge in Racism," The New York Times, May 
27, 1990). Tensions in Spain, while not as high as those in France, are 
often fueled by similar populist anti-immigrant sentiments. 
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54. The coverage included extensive news reports and several articles by . 
important personages in culture and politics. The lawyer and feminist 
activist Lidia Falcon likened the head-scarfto the .. yellow star ... of the 
Jews under Hitler .. (El Pais, January 29, 1990), while Antonio Elorza, a 
well-known academic, insisted that a modern state could not 11tolerate 
fanaticism 11 and that while a Muslim who beats his wife might do so 11in 
strict accordance with Koranic precepts, .. this did not make him less 
culpable in the eyes of the law (El Pais, December 28, 1990). What 
observers did not remark upon was the deeply embedded nature of 
Catholic symbols and usages in Spanish national life. More recently, the 
Spanish press has covered in detail (and with some amusement at the 
problems of the French) Prime Minister Edith Cresson's plans to deal 
with illegal immigration, in part through forced repatriation, the 
so-called 11Charters Cresson .. (La Vanguardia [Revista], July 13, 1991; El 
Pais, July 11 and July 24, 1991; Avui, July 9, 1991). 
55. An authority on Catalan popular culture observes that at least some 
black gegants probably represent the black servants which rich colonists 
brought back with them from Cuba (Capmany 1978: 46, 125, 132-133). If 
this is so, these giant figures encode an ambiguous message. 
56 There is, however, an extensive literature, popular and professional, on 
Spanish emigration both to the New World and, in post-war years, to the 
industrialized countries ofWestern Europe. 
57. For a detailed discussion ofthe various ideological 11strands11 in 
Gramsci's writings, see Femia's (1987) chapter .. Proletarian Hegemony 
and the Question of Authoritarianism ... 
58. One must be careful not to commit historical anchronisms. Still, it is 
legitimate to note that Gramsci himself identified the French Revolution 
in its Jacobin phase as a particularly successful instance of progressive 
hegemonic control (Femia 1987:46-47, 134). Communist movements and 
regimes in Europe and elsewhere have often claimed to be the heirs of the 
French Revolutionary tradition. The Russian Bolsheviks, on the basis of 
such an assertion, presented their seizure of power as a privileged form 
of action (Furet 1990:264-265). 
59. Without getting too deeply into Spanish social history, we might note that 
it was in just this atmosphere that Cervantes wrote his Don Quixote; 
here, 11among many other parables, was the parable of a nation which 
had set out on its crusade only to learn that it was tilting at windmills .. 
(Elliott 1963:294). Cervantes, who had been seriously wounded at Lepanto 
(1572), wrote with more than poetical authority. 
30. The debate on the atraso (backwardness) of Spain was the core issue 
pondered by the intellectuals of the 11Generation of '9811 in the early 
decades of this century. There was anything but unanimity respecting 
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either causes or cures, but they shared a frame of mind which was 
obsessed with the Spanish problem (for a discussion of decline and 
regeneration, see Carr 1982:528-532, 790-791). Whether we are looking at 
the seventeenth century discourse or at more recent manifestations, all 
such soul-searching points to problems in establishing an unchallenged 
hegemonic mind-set. This long Spanish debate on state, society, and 
post-imperial decline shares interesting parallels with the current 
polemic on America and its future (a parallel explicitly noted by Kennedy 
1990). 
61. This is a component of the paranoical hostility to Rome and Spain (later 
transferred to France and in some measure to the Irish) that continues 
to color English perceptions, including those of some anthropologists 
(Fox 1987:2; DiGiacomo and Pi-Sunyer 1988:21). In this country, it fueled 
anti-Spanish sentiment before and during the Spanish-American War 
and today, I believe, still makes itself felt in the guise of an anti-Latina 
prejudice. 
62. See, for example, Collier's (1987: 206-207) stimulating discussion of how 
the Socialists of rural Andalusia used the concepts of "honor" and 
"autonomy"-- central values in agrarian society-- to legitimize their 
policies of political and agrarian reform. 
63. There were, of course, several reasons, most obviously the fact that since 
the territory was in the hands of those who had engineered the revolt, 
any grant of independence would be largely symbolic (but symbols do 
matter and such a declaration might well have had practical 
consequences in recruitment, desertions, etc.). Also, the French, who 
controlled most of Morocco, would no doubt have objected. But none of 
this resolves the obvious contradiction of an anti-fascist government 
fighting for its life but failing to take the revolutionary step of declaring 
an end to colonial rule. 
64. David Kantor in The Jewish Week (October 26, 1990), states that in his 
speech the prince said, "It was my ancestors who expelled you. I, on 
behalf of my father, wecome you now for ever and ever." Early in 1990, 
the Spanish government signed an accord that officially places Jewish 
and Protestant denominations on a legal par with Roman Catholicism. 
The Constitution of 1978 guarantees "freedom of ideology, religion and 
worship"; the new accord makes some important legal and fiscal 
changes and recognizes the "manifest rootedness in Spanish society" of 
the Jewish and Protestant faiths (The New York Times, February 25, 
1990). A few weeks earlier, TVE-1, a major state-wide TV channel, had 
shown the miniseries "Shoah," which one critic characterized as a 
documentary of "horror and truth" (Bercino 1990). 
65. An example of a recent episode with clear anti-Semitic connotations is 
the attempt on the part of an international committee of clergy and 
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laymen to seek the beatification of Queen Isabella, who not only was 
Columbus' sponsor, but signed the edict of expulsion and instituted the 
Inquisition. In Spain, this attempt at saint-making has been recognized 
as the work of a highly conservative party within the church, a group 
that includes Bishop Alvaro Portillo, the head of Opus Dei, and 
ideological allies on the other side of the Atlantic, among them 
Archbishop Bernard Shaw of Boston, the retired Archbishop, John 
Carberry, of St. Louis, and the Colombian Cardinal, Lopez Trujillo 
(Woodward 1991; Valls 1991). One Spanish intellectual, the philosopher 
Reyes Mate (1991), not only laments the failure to foreground the memory 
of an unjust past, but insists that the massive expulsion of Jews from 
Spain set in motion destructive ideological mechanisms that had their 
logical conclusion in the Nazi genocide. 
)6. Spanish real GDP per capita is $8,989 (1990), which puts it into the lower 
tier of advanced market economies, but when other factors are taken into 
account --literacy, life-expectancy, and other measures of social 
well-being-- it ranks among the top twenty countries globally (and ahead 
of the United States) according to the United Nations' "human 
development index" published by the United Nations Development 
Program ("The Human Condition," The Economist, May 26,1990). Looked 
at from the perspective of the Third World, it is certainly a country of 
wealth and potential opportunity. 
17. As the title of a lead editorial in the Economist (November 16, 1991) 
expressed it, "Racism's back" in Europe and elsewhere. It never left, but 
it is certainly more virulent today than at any time in recent decades. It 
can be measured by the resurgence of neo-N azis in Germany (Kinzer 
1991:16), anti-Semitism in Poland, the anti-immigrant policies of the 
French government (extensive coverage in La Vanguardia [Revista], 
July 13, 1991; El Pais, July 11 and 24, 1991; Avui, July 9 and 14, 1991), and 
the success of explicitly anti-immigrant parties in Austria, France, and 
Switzerland. 
18. There are, of course exceptions. After a Liberian asylum-seeker went on 
a rampage and killed two police officers, Manfred Rommel, the mayor of 
Stuttgart, urged citizens to "confront bigotry and violence with the 
deepest resolve." At the officers' funeral he insisted, "We must not 
generalize, and we must not judge the innocent as guilty" (The New 
York Times, November 24, 1991). 
19. This much-told tale enjoys certain similarities with another underclass 
myth that made the rounds in London in the late 1940s. In the English 
story, working class people (and particularly Irish immigrants) were 
said to keep coal in the bathtubs of their council houses. Both stories 
highlight the backwardness of the customs and habits of the pleb 
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